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In 1971 New York City employed over 400,000 individu-
als seventy four percent of whom were "non-uniformed" by
virtue of their not being employed as policemen, firemen,
sanitationmen or transit workers. In the last decade these
employees have become unionized.
The effect these unions may or amy not have on public
policy is difficult to predict. With unionization has come
increased salaries and pensions further straining the al-
ready scarce resources available to our cities for the dis-
tribution of vital services. In recent years public em-
ployees have proven adept at supporting policies and candi-
dates of their own choosing in the political arena.
What's more, these unions bargain and sign contracts
with the city under unique circumstances, the threat of
disruption of vital services, confronting the Mayor with
hundreds of thousands of angry voters, if not an actual
state of emergency.
By reviewing the bargaining experience of the Social
Service Employees Union in the New York City Department of
Welfare between 1962 and 1969 this paper attempts to ex-
amine some of the forces which influence non-uniformed
public employee bargaining demands.
The Social Service Employees Union was somewhat unique
in that it attempted to obtain a fair amount of control
over policy making in the New York City Welfare Department.
It failed. This paper reviews the forces that led to that
attept and the forces that contributed to its failure.
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Title: Associate Professor of History and City Planning
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On May 24, 1967 after five months of protracted ne-
gotiations with the administration the leaders of the
Social Services Employees Union (SSEU) of the New York
City Department of Welfare recommended a work stoppage
to their members to commence on June 19th.
In January of 1965 virtually these same union offi-
cers had led an unprecedentedrt*;enty-eight day strike and
won a tremendous victory. No public employee organization
in recent New York City history had struck for as ionq as
one week. They won the first written contract in welfare
and the first workload specifications and percentage increase
in pay for employees of any Mayorality department.1  They
wrung an agreement from the administration that in the
future all union demands, no matter how inclusive or far-
reaching, would be considered appropriate matters for col-
lective bargaining. Their strike forced the administration
to establish an independeht committee to review the status
of collective bargaining between the city and its employees.
The committee was to produce a written set of recommendations
within six months. Their example had sparked more agres-
sive activity on the part of other public employee organi-
zations and catapulted the SSEU leadership into the for-
front of welfare employee unionism in the nation. They
were strong, they were growing and they had allies.
-3-
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In 1967, however, events occurred as if the events
of 1965 had never taken place. As in 1965, the city
Director of Labor Relations' position was that public
employee unions could not bring to the bargaining table
demands which might affect citywide labor policies,
impinge on management prerogatives, be illegal if granted
or be without the administration's immediate power to
implement. Since he refused to discuss demands which
fell into any of these "non-bargainable" categories and
since he placed most of the SSEU demands within one or
more of them, the SSEU leadership found that there was
precious little they could discuss at the negotiating
table. In 1965 their strike had forced the administra-
tion to redefine "non-bargainability." In 1967 it lobked
as if it would again take a strike to get the administra-
tion to bargain.
In April, after three months without progress at the
negotiating table, the union Executive Board voted to uni-
laterally drop thirty nine of its remaining seventy six
demands. On May 24 the union leadership reluctantly re-
commended that the Executive Board label twelve of their
remaining thirty seven demands "primary demands," fully
educate the media and the membership on these twelve demands
and prepare the staff for a work stoppage on July 19. Leaf-
lets and press releases went out. Local membership meetings
took place in all work locations on or before May 31. On
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June 6 a general membership meeting overwhelmingly endorsed
the proposed work stoppage and on June 9 it was ratified
by 87 percent of the full membership in a secret ballot
in the welfare centers. On June 19 the SSEU began its
second major strike in thirty months.
The SSEU was then and is today an organization of
non-uniformed public employees. In 1971 New York City
employed over 400,000 individuals seventy four percent
of whom we shall call "non-uniformed" by virtue of their
not being employed as policemen, firemen, sanitationmen
or transit workers.2 They are teachers, cooks, clerks,
secretaries, social workers, auto-repair mechanics, laborers,
lab technicians, administrators, accountants, supervisors,
psychologists and air pollution experts. They man New York
City's bureaucracies; health and hospitals, parks and re-
creation, public works, schools, housing and welfare, civil
defense, traffic and parking, human rights, museums and
libraries. In 1972 305 out of every 10,000 people in New
York City were non-uniformed public employees.3 Within the
last decade these employees have become unionized. District
Council 37 (DC 37) of the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME), which
represents the largest number of these workers in New York
City, grew from 32,000 in 1962 to 100,000 members in 1972.4
The United Federation of Teachers, which represents the se-
cond largest number of non-uniformed public employees,
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increased its membership from under 5,000 in 1961 to over
50,000 in 1969.5 When we think of public employee unionism
today we think especially of the trials and tribulations
of Mayor Lindsay in New York. However, this phenomenon is
not confined to New York City alone. It has become nation-
wide. Mayor Wagner's decision during the fifties to support
the organizational needs of public employee unions (dues
check-off and exclusive bargaining certificates) and
AFSCME's decision during the same period to commit substan-
tial organizing resources to New York, gave recent non-
uniformed public employee unionism a head:-start in that
city.6 The question is no longer whether non-uniformed
public employees can or will be organized, but what organi-
zational forms their unions will take and what effect these
unions will have on public policy.
What shgpe can we expect non-uniformed public employee
unionism to take in the near future? Will they copy
trade and craft union models from the private sector? If
so, which will they choose? Or, will their organizations
more closely resemble private associations and professional
societies? Perhaps they will opt for a combination of the
above. In any case, we need to know more about the forces
that influence organizational choices among public employees.
The effect these unions may or may not have on public
policy is even more difficult to predict. With unioniza-
tion has come increased salaries, pensions and overtime
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compensation, further straining the already scarce re-
sources avAilable to our cities for the distribution of
vital services. Employee compensation of one form or
another was New York City's single largest expenditure in
8
1969, 60 percent of the budget. Traditionally, unions in
the private sectQr, with tremendouslxfinancial and human
resources at their disposal for lobbying, plblicity and
campaigning, have been powerful political forces. In
recent years public employee unions have proven to be
equally ddept at supporting policies and candidates of
their own choosing in the political arena;
Finally, these unions bargain and *ign contracts with
the cities under unique circumstances, the threat of dis-
ruption of vital public services, confronting the Mayor
with the possibility of hundreds of thousands of angry
voters, if not an actual state of emergency. What kinds
of demands can we expect non-uniformed public employees to
make at the bargaining table? Will they want to discuss
departmental policy and organization as well as bread and
butter issues? If so, why? Some of their demands may be
entirely political. What are some of the forces which in-
fluence public employee collective bargaining demands?
This paper examines this last question in some detail
by reviewing public employee unionism in the New York City
Welfare Department during the 1960's. I hope the discussion
which follows will also shed some light on the broader.
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questions mentioned earlier. What shape will unionism take
among non-uniformed public employees, and how will these
uions affect public policy?
During the 1960's public employee unionism and city
labor relations came of age in New York. In 1960. unionism
among non-uniformed public employees in the city was new,
scattered and complacent. The city had no centralized formal
way of relating to either its uniformed or non-uniformed
employee organizations. By 1970 non-uniformed public
employee unions in the city were strong, well established,
stable and aggressive. The city had an Office of Collective
Bargaining which had already established a body of pre-
cedents and policies to refer to as it carried out its
activities.
Our interest in the SSEU stems from this union's
attempt during this period to significantly alter depart-
mental policies and procedures through the collective bar-
gaining process. What forces contributed to this attempt
andsince by the end of the decade the union was no longer
interested in trying, what forces contributed to its demise?
To shed some light on these questions- I now intend
to look at the emergence of the SSEU.
CHAPTER ONE
UNIONS IN WELFARE
Employee organizations in New York City's Department
of Welfare have a long history of involvement in policy
matters. Before World War"II, the State, County and Muni-
cipal Workers of America:, CIO (SCHMWA) organized a large
local in the New York City Welfare Department. SCMWA was
allied with the Workers Alliance, an organization of un-
employed men and women on relief,1 and exercised some
control over hiring and advancement within the department.2
During the 1939's those who had the most to gain politi-
cally from such charges argued that the Communist Party
ran the department through the union. The more conserva-
tive employees of the department, mostly Irish Catholics,
formed their own organization in the late 1939's, Council
330 of the Civil Service Forum.
In late 1946, SCMWA became Local 1 of the newly
formed CIO international, United Public Workers (UPW),
which had strong locals in other city departments, notably
education and sanitation. Local 1, UPW, was stronger and
more active than any union since in welfare. In 1948 the
city's Commissioner of Investigation, John Murtaugh, com-
pleted a report on the cost and administration of welfare
-9-
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in the city - over a third of which was devoted to Local 1.
He charged that the "UPW-CIO exerted an undue influence on
policies within the department? and engaged in "activities
generally recognized to be beyond the scope of proper func-
tions of public employees. "3 The report claims that Local 1:
(1) sponsored political causes and candidates
(2) published a newspaper "replete" with political
articles
(3) encouraged its members to further its political
programs within welfare offices
(4) ran a Welfare Studies Committee "comprised of
employees in supervisory positions" which sponsored and
campaigned for changes in official Welfare Department poli-
cies and procedures
(5) organized street corner demonstrations of reci-
pients and layment. to support these changes
(6) urged its membership to suggest ways in which
these changes could best be instituted
(7) caused unsanctioned changes in official policies
and procedures to be carried out by members of the staff
(8) used departmental staff meetings for its own
organizational purposes
(9) carried out organizing activities during working
hours and
(10) organized "mass demonstrations" on department
premises to present its grievances. 4
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Finally, Commissioner Murtaugh pointed out that
organizational affiliation influenced supervisor's atti-
tudes toward department regulations and behavior toward
department personnel. Upon reading this report Mayor
O'Dwyer declared that "he would not tolerate in any city
department or agency, labor unions that go beyond their
'proper function' of promoting the welfare of their members
to interfere in matters of any city and departmental
policy."5
Welfare Commissioner Hillard, aided by Council 330,
began a two year campaign against Local 1. He reorganized
the Department, filling all new administrative positions
with non-UPW members, and established a non-UPW Board of
Employees. The department placed restrictions on the uses
of department premises and time for union activity. New
grievance procedures were established. The union could no
longer present its grievances during demonstrations nor
could employees involved in grievances attend their initial
or appeal hearings as they had done before. Two new unions,
the AFL Federation of Municipal Employees (FME) and CIO
Government Employees Organizing Committee (GEOC), were
accredited by the department to represent its employees for
the express purpose of replacing Local 1.6 Dissidents who
split from the UPW in 1948 had formed the GEOC. The Depart-
ment used red-baiting, dismissals, suspensions and trans-
fers in its campaign against Local 1. In 1948 the UPW was
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one of eleven unions expelled from the CIO for "communist
domination" and in 1950 the New York City Welfare Depart-
ment withdrew its official recognition of Local 1. The
two year lag is a testimonial to the UPW's strength within
the-department. By 1951 the UPW was dead. Some of its
more competent organizers joined the Teamsters and formed
City Employees Union Local 237 in an attempt to reenter the
department. This failed when the department warned its
staff against joining Local 237. because of its domination
by ex-UPW staff, ise. Communists.7
Other organizations sponsored by the department
moved in to fill the vacuum left by the UPW, namely the
AEL's AFSCME (formerly FME) Local 1193, the CIO's GEOC,
and the Civil Service Forum. In December 1955 the AFL and
CIO merged. In July 1956. the AFL's AFSCME and CIO's Go-
vernment and Civic Employees (GEOC in New York) became
the first unions to merge within the united federation on
the internationAl'level. In July 1957 the two merged at
the local level in New York as District Council 37, AFSCME,
AFL-CIO((DC 37). Local 371, the first local of DC 37,
was chartered in the welfare department. Despite this
organizational activity there was very little organized
employee activity in the welfare department between 1951
and 1961. This is not surprising. People were not-likely
to forget the two year long UPW purge, especially since
the personnel policies instituted during the purge continued
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throughout the decade.8 Staff members who complained
about policies, assignments or working conditions could
expect to be transferred to the welfare center farthest
from their homes. In addition they might be suspended or,
if possible, fired. Brownsville was the worse possible
transfer; the employees called it "Alcatraz."9 A number
of UPW members who stayed in the department ended up in
Brownsville. Later the SSEU would claim that people were
sent to Brownsville to be fired, usually for minor viola-
tions of department rules.10 Staff members could expect
little help from their unions who owed their prominence in
the department to the administration rather than the em-
ployees. During this period there was no contract, no
collective bargaining and no formal grievance machinery.
However, the unions and employee associations in the de-
partment did manage to secure favors for some of their
members and leaders from the administration.
Employee associations were relatively strong during
this period.11 They took on a number of forms. Some were
religious. The Catholics had the Ozanan Guild, the
Protestants the Order of St. George and the Jews their
Association of Jewish Welfare Department employees and
B'nai Brith. Others were ethnic. Though most of them
belonged to the Ozanan Guild the Irish had an Emerald >
Society and the Italians a Columbian Society. The Blacks
formed a NAACP chapter and the Assistant Supervisors and
Supervisors each had their own professional associations.
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Historically Black professionals could get jobs in
welfare and the department's NAACP chapter was strong and
influential in the state NAACP. Unlike the other associa-
tions it had a program and raised policy questions. The
professional associations were for the most part interested
in professional standards, job satisfaction, and civil
service issues. The ethnic and religious associations
which belonged to similar state and city organizations
often behaved like political clubhouses. All used politics
and friendships to work out minor grievances and advance-
ment for their members. To operate they all needed de-
partment recognition. They had to register and put their
constitutions and by-laws on file with the department which
maintained an up-to-date list of recognized associations.
Probably the best example of Local 371's "weakness"
(or "company status" as some would say) during this period
was the existence of an Eligibles Association made up of
employees eligible for promotion. This association pushed
for actual promotions rather than the use of "acting" de-
signations. Through a widespread use of acting designa-
tions the Department avoided Civil Service regulations
against demotion.12
Born during the McCarthy era, Local 371 was not
particularly evil or corrupt; just unaggressive and
apathetic towards the needs of department employees. Dur-
ing "collective bargaining" sessions in 1961 and 1962 it
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signed non-binding "Memoranda of Understanding" with the
city. If one ignores the space taken up by the city's
letterhead these Memoranda barely cover two pages; just
enough space for niceties and new salary charts. The
12,500 employees in some twenty job titles in the welfare
department could hardly have seen these Memoranda as con-
tracts. In 1958 Mayor Wagner's Executive Order #49
virtually guaranteed Local 371's ascendancy in the Depart-
ment. Touted as the "little Wagner Act," Executive Order
#49 declared that the city would encourage the practices
of collective bargaining as they exitted in the private
sector when it dealt with its own employees. The Order
provided that;
(1) the city would bargain with the elected repre-
sentatives of its employees
(2) the Commissioner of Labor would determine "appro-
priate" bargaining units within each department
(3) the Commissioner of Labor would conduct elections
within these units when so petitioned
(4) the Commissioner of Labor could grant certificates
of majority status within these units
(5) the city would grant exclusive bargaining rights
to representatives with majority certificates. In addi-
tion the Commissioner of Labor was empowered to resolve
all unresolved grievances and disputes between a department
and its employees and public employee unions were not
-16-
permitted "closed shop" privileges.13
Executive Order #49 reaffirmed the provisions of a
1954 Executive Order which created the city Department of
Labor, required that grievance procedures be established in
every city department, established joint union-management
labor relations committees in every department and
affirmed the right of city employees to form and join labor
14
unions. Because it existed when Executive Order #49 went
into effect Local 371 was one of the first unions granted
exclusive bargaining rights under its provisions. These
Executive Orders only applied to the Mayorality departments,
not all city employees, and expressly exempted policemen
and firemen. Nor were they legally binding.15 But they
were city policy and, in conjunction with dues check-off
privileges also granted Local 371 in 1958, served to in-
stitutionalize Loc&l 371's position in the Welfare Depart-
ment. However, their provisions would be available to dis-
sidents within Local 371 who left to form a new staff or-
ganization in 1961.
In 1959 and 1960 a group of Local 371 members, led
by Sam Podel and located primarily in the Brownsville
Welfare Center, formed the Committee for a More Militant
Union. Twice the Committee ran opposition slates in Local
371's elections and twice it lost. In the last of these
elections less than 40 percent of the membership actually voted.
At that time as little as 25 percent of the department's
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social service staff belonged to Local 371, an indication
of how seriously the staff took Local 371.16 Convinced
that the staff couldn't be persuaded to change Local 371 from
the inside, the Brownsville group formally left the Local
in 1961 and formed the Social Services Employees (SSE),
an association of professional welfare department employees.
The SSE received recognition and dues check-off privileges
from the department. That summer, the workers in Boro Hall,
angered by Local 371's latest salary agreements with the
city which they considered inadequate/ began to talk about
forming their own organization. This group, led by Joe
Tepedino, also protested rising caseloads. In October, the
Boro Hall group joined the SSE, since it already had re-
cognition and a dues check-off. After the merger a debate
raged within the association, The Boro Hall members
wanted to create a new department-wide collective bargain-
ing unit and the Brownsville members, although not opposed
to activism, wanted to goad Loc&l 371 into more represen-
tative activity.1 7 In June 1962 Joe Tepedino became
president of the SSE and it became the SSEU, a new union
of welfare department dmployees in caseworker and super-
visory titles. Serious organizing. began and the SSEU
started to grow.
In 1962 the department operated out of ancient,
deteriorating buildings, abandoned factories and condemned
school houses, any space the city could find in the run-down
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areas to which it banished its urban poor. Heating sys-
tems continually broke down during the winter and the
absence of air conditioning brought no relief from the
summer heat. There was never enough office equipment,
dictating machines, typewriters, file space, or even desks.
Employees had no place to relax, no place to get away from
the din of ringing telephones, nagging supervisors, or the
general pandemonium of welfare centers, except perhaps,
the lavatory.
Salaries were low. In 1962, most caseworkers
earned less than $6,000. In 1964 three out of every four
workers earned less than the $6500 considered necessary
by the Community Council of Greater New York in its
"Annual Price Survey and Family Budget Costs " for a
family of four to achieve a "modest, but adequate" stan-
18
dard of living in the city.
Opportunities for advancement were equally poor. In
1961 there hadn't been a competitive exam for assistant
supervisory positions for three years and there wasn't going
to be one for three more years. As of December 1960 there
had been no examination for case supervisor for eight years.
Caseloads were high. To hear employees who were there
in 1961 tell it hardly anyone's caseload was near the
department's goal of 65. Most people carried caseloads
of 75 familes and up. Some had over 100. This was before
caseloads began to rise precipitously in New York as they
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did everywhere during the 1960's. By 1963 the New York
City welfare roles were rising at the rate of 1,000 per
month.2 0 By 1967 the increase was so great that in order
to keep up the department would have had to open and staff
21
one new welfare center every six weeks. It was never
able to keep up with the demand.
Caseworkers received no training. New staff attended
a period of classes on regulations and procedures, got a
tour of a welfare center and then went to work with a
reduced caseload. Under pressure that reduced caseload
became "normal" within a few months. Trainees learned on
the job.
The job itself was frustrating. After cracking under
pressure and being revived by a bucket of cold water, a
mythical Ivan Denisovitch in an early SSEU organizing
leaflet pulls his typewriter from beneath his desk and
types;
What Ivan gan never get...an outside line.
Where half of Ivan's clients are...in-service.
Where the other half are...on the incoming line.
What the object of our program is...service.
What the clients are begging for...service.
What, due to red tape, prerequisites and overwork,
it is impossible for Ivan to give..2,ervice
When Ivan gets it from...both ends.
"People felt like they were always barely holding the lid
down on a pot about to blow," said Al Viani, an ex-presi-
dent of Local 371. "Those who stayed either went crazy
or became enforcers," explained an ex-SSEU officer. 2 3
Most quit. Personnel turnover during the early 1960's
-20-
has become legendary. In 1961 almost half of the case-
workers were in their first year with the department. In
each of the three preceeding years between thirty six and
forty two percent of the staff had left the department.
At any given point in time this meant that there were well
over 200 caseworker vacancies and more than 15,000 uncovered
cases, cases which during emergencies other workers had to
24
handle in addition to their "normal" caseloads. Turn-
overs interrupted the continuity of service to clients,
kept the experience level of caseworkers low, wasted de-
partment training costs, prevented performance of rehabi-
litative functions, drained the emotional and physical re-
sources of caseworkers and their supervisors and sapped
the department's reservoir of experienced people to fill
future administrative and supervisory vacancies. According
to Judy Mage, an ex-president of the SSEU, "no one outside
the department ever really understood what turnover did to
caseworker confidence and self-esteem, nor the fear super-
virosr had of over-approval.25 A damaging 'protect your-
self' psychology pervaded the department."2 6
Poor training, bad working conditions, low salaries
and the nature of the joball weighed heavily on the pri-
marily college educated, professionally oriented case-
worker and supervisory staff.
To protest these working conditions the SSEU
sponsored sit-ins, work stoppages, mass pickets, grievance
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meetings during working hours and other activities in
various welfare centers across the city between 1962 and
1964. Its leaders championed the caseworker's cause in
the press, before city council and at professional con-
ventions. During this period. four incidents "made" the
SSEU by convincing staff that mass action could be effec-
tive, Local 371 was a "paper union" only interested in
dues collection and that the department's anti-union per-
sonnel practices, if not already dead, could safely be
defied. In May 1962 the SSEU led a noontime demonstration
of more than 200 workers in front of the Amsterdam Welfare
Center to protest the mass transfer of 1,000 cases to that
center without a commensurate increase in staff. The Com-
missioner agreed to assign twelve additional caseworkers
to cover the expanded caseloads. lie took no reprisals
against any of the staff who demonstrated.27
On September 20, 1962 Local 371 threatened to strike
if the city didn't come up with addifferent salary and case-
load package than the one already offered durin negotia-
tions for its 1963 "contract." On September 23 the SSEU
Executive Board voted to recommend that its membership
support the strike. A September 24 leaflet appraised the
staff of this decision, explained the negotiating issues
and urged the staff to prepare for a work stoppage. On
September 27, an SSEU Membership meeting voted to join
Local 371 if it struck. On October 2 the SSEU sought the
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formation of a united strike organizing committee with
Local 371 to make preparations. However, on October 9
Local 371 cancelled its strike threat set for the 10th
and on December 6 signed another two-page Memorandum of
Understanding, the provisions of which did not differ sub-
stantially from the city's original offer. The staff which
had responded well to the possibility of a strike was in-
censed and the SSEU gained members. The SEEU gained be-
cause it had predicted that Local 371 might only be bluffing
and because the membership felt that the bluff was aimed
at itself rather than the city. Neither the department nor
Local 371 made any strike preparations during the twenty-
day threat and Local 371 signed a full three weeks before
its December 31 contract deadline.2 8
At 9:00 a.m. on February 28, 1963 the entire Boro
Hall staff assemb&ed in the welfare center's auditorium to
discuss some pressing grievances, among them the pay increase
and sixty case workload limit the December 6 Memorandum
had promised. They wanted to know why these provisions
hadn't taken effect, especially their pay increase. The
meeting had not been planned; it was spontaneous. The case-
workers asked the center's director to come down and answer
their questions. He refused and g4Ve them five minutes to
get back to work. They stayed. The next day, Friday,
March 1, the staff refused to enter the center and picketed
outside for the entire day, getting excellent television
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coverage. Over the weekend more than 120 workers received
suspensions in the mail and on Monday, March 4, they all
went back to work. The decision to go back was controver-
sial, but the SSEU was not yet strong enough to carry a
city-wide fight to the department. The suspensions, ex-
cept for two leaders (one Joe Tepedino) who got four days
each, were revoked. The fact that the staff acted in
unison, despite internal differences, and that nobody got
fired made the "Incident at Boro Hall" a victory.29
The 1962 Social Security Amendments concerning
welfare said that in order for the states to get seventy
five percent federal reimbursement caseloads must be re-
duced to sixty and a program of specifically listed ser-
vices to clients implemented by July,1963. If this did
not happen the states were required to show proof that
they planned to reduce caseloads and that steps had been
taken to make it possible for workers to provide the ser-
vices listed in the 1962 amendments without such a reduc-
tion. On July 10, 1963 four SSEU officers, Joe Tepedino,
Judy Mage, Dom Cuchinotta, and George Betts,Asent a letter
to Kathryn Goodwin, Director of the Bureau of Family
Services, Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
charging that the city had failed to implement the 1962
amendments, especially regarding caseloads, and that it had
no plans to do so. Four days later the union sent a
similar letter to Anthony Celebreze, the Secretary of
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Health, Education and Welfare, charging that the city was
only interested in collecting the necessary statistics for
increased federal reimbursement, not in providing services.
On August 10 all four were suspended and the SSEUs de-
partmental recognition revoked, henceforth they could not
hold.-meetings or distribute literature on department pre-
mises. On August 13, the SSEU Executive Board hired the
four at their normal rate of pay and on October 11 after
a hearing they were reinstated by the department.3 0
In September of 1964 the SSEU petitioned the city
Department of Labor for a representative election in the
caseworker's bargaining unit, and on October 9 won the
election by a margin of almost two to one - 2,642 to 1,411.
The victory was overwhelming. The SSEU polled more than
twice as many votes as it had members, and Local 371
polled fewer votes than it had dues-paying members. There
was some immediate fall-out. The leadership of Local 371
resigned en -mass. In order to maintain their credibility
among the clerks and supervisors, their successors followed
the SSEU into its January strike. Jerry Wurf, President
of the AFSCME international, who had worked as AFSCME's
organizer in New York from 1947 to 1958 and as DC 37's
Executive Director from 1958 to 1964, replaced DC 37's
Executive Director, Calogero Taibi, with Victor Gotbaum
from Chicago. Ie wasn't going to lose any more of his New
York locals to indepenents. 3 1
When it won the 1964 election the SSEU was a craft
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union. Asked why they -rejected the trade union model and
why theydidn't include the clerks and supervisors in the
union, Joe Tepedino replied, "As far as the clerks are con-
cerned, we pushed for a professional, technical, homogeneous
organization. We did not believe that their inclusion was:
conducive to an effective union. (They) had no common
interests with the caseworkers and that was one of the
major problems with the old union - it tried to represent
everybody." However, he said that he would have welcomed
a militant organization among the clerks which the SSEU
could ally with when their interests converged. In fact
the SSEU toyed with the idea of helping the clerks to organ-
ize and went as far as to draw up a draft charter for an
independent among the clerks. However, the clerks weren't
too receptive and these plans were shelved when the 1965
bargaining and strike coalition between SSEU and Local
371 explicitly forbade raiding. The supervisors did fit
the SSEU craft union model. Why didn't the SSEU petition
for a representative election in their bargaining unit in
1964? "At that time,"Tepedino explained, "they were more
conservative and might have jeopardized the SSEU's goals.
Our primary goal was to improve the caseworker's lot and
we felt that we had to concentrate on gaining bargaining
rights in their unit's titles. (Besides,) before the
strike (1965) they were difficult to recruit." 3 2
The SSEU was also an independent union, unwilling to
affiliate with any AFL-CIO union. Again, in Joe Tepedino's
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words, "most affiliation structures prevent effective
democratic processes - only providing for continuity at
the top. We wanted to rule ourselves by the democratic
process" and wanted "to make that process open and visible
to the membership."33 Indeed, the SSEU's structure was
democratic, painfully so when it counted most of the
approximately 8,500 caseworkers in the department as members
in 1966 and 1967. The SSEU was run by an Executive Board
composed of delegates and alternates elected from each work
location as well as the city-wide leadership. The number
of delegates depended upon the number of members in each
work location. By 1966 the Executive Board numbered over
one hundred people. In contrast, Local 371's Executive
Board was composed of ten members elected at-large like
the city-wide officers and five members appointed by the
president. The SSEU made a great deal of the fact that
traditionally this structure meant that Local 371 was domi-
nated by clerks and supervisors, not caseworkers who were
by far the largest single gropp of department employees. 3 4
The following five themes dominated the 1962 to 1964
SSEU organizing campaign, its leaflets and demonstrations:
(1) Caseworker salaries were among the lowest of any
group of college graduates working for the City, State or
Federal governments.
(2) Heavy caseloads and work pressures, along with
low salaries, created an unbearable rate of turnover.
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(3) Demoralization of staff and the absence of any
sense of dignity or professional pride.
(4) Miserable working conditions - overcrowding and
a lack of facilities and equipment.
(5) Representation by a company union which owed its
allegiance to the administration--,rather than the staff.
To alleviate these problems the SSEU literature
offered five solutions:
(1) Alter the city's Career and Salary Plan to allow
proportional increased in pay and financial rewards for
experience and education.
(2) Win specific guarantees that caseloads be reduced,
maintained at a reduced level and covered.
(3) Change the job - "the job of a welfare worker is
an inherently worthwhile job and can be transformed into
a stimulating and satisfying job." 3 5
(4) Provide adequate desk space, sufficent out-line
telephones, air-conditioning and comfortable lounge areas.
(5) Form a militant union - one willing and able
to mobilize staff in support of their demands during and
between negotiating periods.
If these five things happenedthe literature claims,
staff turnover would decrease. The arguments struck a
responsive chord and Local 371 lost the 1964 election.
It's important to realize that these issues and
solutions were directed not at the department, but at Local
371. Most leaflets attacked Local 371 directly - few,
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the department. When the department was attacked during
demonstrations and sit-ins, Local 371 was also attacked
for its inactivity or lack of support of staff. The SSEU
never tired of pointing out that its leaders were case-
workers, with caseloads, working in welfare centers ("We
are the Staff," is the title of one leaflet), while
Local 371's were not. The SSEU was trying to win an
election, not formulate collective bargaining demands:
To say that our situation is the fault of
the city administration is absolutely true - but
that doesn't say anything. We can expect that our
employer - whether it be in private industry or in
government - will alwas try to pay as little as
he can get away with.
Since the SSEU planned to try to take the supervisors
away from Local 371 in the near future, its organizing
campaign against Local 371 carried right thvough the 1964
bargaining period and the 1965 strike, as did Local 371's
defense. These campaign issues and solutions ended up
in the city's lap at contract time. Most troublesome- to the
city and eventually to the- uniop was the union's translation
of its implicit promise to alter the nature of the job into
specific bargaining demands. To do so the SSEU had to
enter the area of departmental policy. This was
anathema to the city and, in certain instances, created
dissension within the ranks of the union.
But the die was cast. In November and December of
1964 and January of 1965 the SSEU took policy-related
demands first to the bargaining table, then .into a strike.
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They did the same in 1966 and 1967. In doing so they
added another item to Commissioner Murtaugh's 1948 list
of activities not to be tolerated among public employees,
During the next three years, the SSEU would do everything
the UPW did, and then some.
CHAPTER TWO
THE 1965 STRIKE
If the city administration had any hopes that the
new caseworker's union would be as easy to deal with as
Local 371 they were quickly dispelled. On October 15 the
SSEU opened its collective bargaining period with a mass
demonstration and picket at City Hall.
The 1964 SSEU Collective Bargaining Program reflected
the union's organizing campaign issues. Concerning salaries
and career opportunities, the SSEU demanded that case-
workers be exempted from the city's Career and Salary Plan
so that they could receive proportional increases in pay,
financial rewards for experience and educational differen-
tials for graduate school credits. It called for a $1,300
increase in pay for caseworkers and paid overtime rather
than compensatory time off (which staff never had time to
take) for overwork. In addition it wanted a fully paid
Health and Life Insurance Program with a choice of plans for
different kinds of families and a separate, fully paid
pension plan for Welfare Department employees. The SSEU
also wanted to change the caseworkers official job title
from Social Investigator to Caseworker,2 eliminate the De-
partment's Trainee title since these people carried full
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caseloads anyway and establish a Senior Caseworker title
to permit experienced staff with professional skills to
engage in rehabilitative service work. The Senior Case-
workers would benefit from lowered levels of approval3 and
lower caseloads than those carried by Caseworkers. Finally,
the Program demanded free tuition for social work training
at C.U.N.Y., an expanded department scholarship program
and leaves of absence without pay for graduate study in
social work or related fields.
To reduce caseloads and check staff turnover the
SSEU demanded caseload maximums of fifty for Caseworkers,
thirty five for Problem Caseloads and twenty five for
Family Counseling in conjunction with a caseload enforce-
ment clause which would go into effect if the caseload
maximums in any center exceeded the contractual limit for
more than one month. Such a situation would be considered
a violation of the contract and require arbitration. A
ten percent personnel reserve would be created and main-
tained to handle existing uncovered cases and those created
by staff turnover or rising welfare rolls.4  The SSEU also
demanded a number of procedural and policy changes designed
to reduce paperwork in the department. Among these were
the institution of semi-annual clothing grants to clients,
several lower levels of approval and the use of data-proces-
sing equipment for all budget determinations. Finally,
they wanted reduced working hours and an increase of annual
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paid leave to twenty seven days, paid sick leave to eighteen
days and six days leave for religious observances. These
last three items had been enjoyed by department employees
before the Career and Salary Plan went into effect in 1954.
The next group of SSEU contractual demands were in-
tended to deal with the demoralization of staff and the
nature of the job. To understand the extent to which the
SSEU intended to change the-easeworker's job through the
four committees established here consider the Introduc-
tion to the Collective Bargaining Program:
In an age of increasing awareness of the problems
of social welfare, it is incumbent upon any union
in a public welfare agency to fight for a program
that will benefit-the staff members it represents;
benefit the recipients it services; help the ad-
ministration in carrying out its function in the
community; and insure that the taxpayer's funds are
efficiently administered.
The adoption of the SSE Program will constitute a
giant step toward these objectives...fundamental
changes must be instituted within the department
of welfare to cope with the dynamic changes occur-
ring within our society....The social responsibilities
of the department cannot be met without a trained,
experienced, and stable staff. Such a staff cannot
be obtained without a bold program of reforms.5
The SSEU called for the establishment of a Labor-
Management Committee to oversee the implementation of the
contract, negotiate departmental policy changes (all policy
changes requiring an increase in the amount of work and/or
personnel were to be negotiated with the union in advance),
hear the union's position on all policy changes which
affected the caseworkerb'. relationships with their clients
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and negotiate the implementation of Executive Orders which
affected the union's ability to carry out its functions as
a bargaining agent. Second, the union demanded a Joint
Personnel Committee to review all personnel policies.
Specifically, people involved in disciplinary actions or
special investigations were to be permitted to bbtain
representation, permitted to consult with their represen-
tative during the process and be informed in writing of the
changes or investigation well beforehand. Grievance
appeals to the city Department of Labor were to be given
a full hearing within two weeks and Executive Order #415
revised so that people outside the appelant's job title
could represent him. No one was to be suspended pending
appeal. Third, the Program demanded the establishment of
a tri-partite (labor/managment/neutral) Case Decision
Appeals Board to provide recourse to caseworkers who felt
they were being compelled to carry out seriously incorrect
decisions on any of their cases. Its decisions would be
binding. Fourth, a list of caseworkers seeking transfers
was to be maintained in all work locations. Transfers were
to be made in order of seniority from the names on the list.
No forced transfers could be made until all voluntary re-
quests were acted on and the.center Grievance Committee was
to be empowered to block all arbitrary and involuntary trans-
fers. Finally, the SSEU asked that staff meetings be held
in each work place at least once a month with a representative
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of the Central Office present.
To improve working conditions the SSEU demanded that
all centers have centrex telephone systems, air-conditioning,
adequate supplies, a comfortable lounge or lunchroom and
beverage vending machines. Seven w&lfare centers listed
in the Program were to be renovated or relocated in modern
buildings. For itself. the union demanded the right to meet
in any office during lunch hours to carry out union busiw
ness, the right for union officers to attend such meetings
and a bulletin board in every office where the union could
post its literature.
The SSEU made similar demands for the other titles
in its bargaining unite Children's Counselor, Home Econo-
mist and Homemaker. The entire Program contained over 200
demands.6 In contrast, Local 371's Fall 1964 Collective
Bargaining Demands stuck to more traditional union issues -
salary raises, educational and experience differentials,
overtime, caseload and workload reductions and the use of
reserve staff. It wanted the Assistant Supervisor of Social
Work title changed to Senior Social Worker with work of a
"more responsible nature" assigned and a reduction in the
Social Worker training period.7 Finally, Local 371 demanded
a Health and Welfare fund with a choice of plans paid by
the city and an agreement from the city to seek legislation
to enable it to pay full pension costs. (To heighten the
contrast, the SSEU simply demanded full pension payments.)
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At this point Local 371 represented all clerical and super-
visory titles in the department as well as some other minor
titles. Local 371's demands did not mention the Career and
Salary Plan, caseload enforcement, procedural or policy
changes or any of the items the SSEU listed under the
headings of Working Conditions or the Nature of the Job.8
Local 371's bargaining philosophy differed markedly
from that of the SSEU. Instead of using the nature of
welfare department employment to justify demands to change
the job and policy, Local 371 used it only to justify de-
mands for increased salaries and better working conditions.
Because New York's welfare system had more ambitious pro-
grams and more complex administrative procedures than any
other city's welfare system, the "Introduction" to Local
371's bargaining package argued, its employees had more
responsibilities and more work than welfare employees
elsewhere. Therefore, Local 371 demanded, New York City
should "become the leader in setting salaries and working
standards for public welfare employees throughout the
country." The rest of the "Introduction" contained wage,,
duty and workload comparisons between New York City's Wel-
fare Department and departments in other cities, reflecting
several file folders of research done by union staff during
the summer.9 This package was compiled by the leadership
of 371 which resigned when they lost the caseworkers to the
SSEU. The new leadership kept the original package and its
basic philosophy, but upped the demands to include
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improvements in physical plants and facilities, the estab-
lishment of a labor management committee, transfers, the
use of department premises for union activities and
union-management consultation when the SSEU's inclusion
of such demands forced them to do so. They were worried
about losing the supervisors to the SSEU.10 Local 371's
proposed contract language on these additional topics was
neither as strong nor as specific as that proposed by the
SSEU. After the strike, however, with a few significant
differences, their two contracts were going to be remark-
ably similar, Local 371 getting more than it originally
bargained for and the SSEU less.
The policy and management issues which the SSEU
took to the bargaining table in 1964 and 1965 were not
controversial among the membership. Joe Tepedino said
"in 1965 we felt we had an identity of interests with the
clients, (one) that was accepted universally by the
members."11l
The administration reacted quickly to the union's
Collective Bargaining Program, refusing to bargain on most
of the issues presented for one or more of the four reasons
described in the introduction to this paper. To the union
their reaction looked something like this:
SSEU DEMAND ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE
l Repeal of Career and 1) Coll. bargaining must take
salary plan place within the Plan. It can-
not repeal it.
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2) Elimination of Trainee
and establishment of Senior
Caseworker titles,
3) Increased annual and
sick leave, scholarships
and education differential;
cash overtime pay and a
seven hour work day.
4)- Caseload limits
5) 10% personnel reserve
6) Office Relocation
7) Pensions
8) Breaks and Office
supplies
9) Lowered levels of
Approval
10) Written contract.
2) A function of the Civil
Service Commission, coll.
bargaining may not usurp its
power.
3) These policies come under
the Career and Salary Plan and
apply to 100,000 other employees.
Since the unions involved don't.
represent a majority, they have
no authority to bargain and
city negotiators can't make
special agreements for indivi-
dual groups of employees.1 2
4) Bargainable but primarily
a management issue
5) The Mayor determines staf-
fing. Coll. Bargaining may not
usurp his authority.
6) A function of the Capital
Budget and Site Selection
Committees, not Coll. Bar-
gaining.
7) A legislative matter which
must go to the Mayor's Pension
Committee.
8) Take it up with the
Commissioner.
9) An administrative and
management decision, not coll.
bargaining.
10) Not with the inclusion of
the above.1 3
Numbers 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 above contain a fifth reason put
forward by the city for not including certain items in a
contract, "not bargainable in this forum." (i.e.. before
the Department of Labor). Beside the Civil Service
Commission, Pension Committee, Mayor himself, Budget
Director, Site Selection Committee, and Welfare Commissioner,
the Department of Labor argued that other union demands
inv6lved the Board of Estimate, City Personnel Director,
and even the State Department of Social Welfare and thus
did not fall within its purview during contract negotiations.
-38-
This argument especially rankled when in late December
the Department of Labor brought in the Civil Service Com-
missioner, who was also City Personnel Director, as an im-
partial third party to help mediate the dispute. He re-
fused to discuss Civil Service or Personnel Policy related
issues in his role as mediator.14
Thus the SSEU was faced not only with the problem
of non-bargainability but with the problem of who to bar-
gain with as well. The Mayor refused to enter the dispute
during either the negotiating period or the strike. At
the same time he maintained that he couldn't legally turn
his statutory powers over to others, especially to biiding
arbitration.15 Local 371 and the SSEU argued that since
the Mayor delegated various of his powers to the city de-
partments and their Commissioners there was no precedent
for doing the same with his agents at the collective
bargaining table. Indeed, for some time the Department
of Labor had had power to negotiate wage increases. The
unions also argued that since the Mayor appointed the various
Commissioners he controlled them and could compel them to
abide by any collective bargaining agreement he might sign.
Finally, since the Career and Salary Plan was developed and
implemented by the Mayor he certainly had the power to
alter it. The plan itself was arbitratily imposed only on
Mayorality Departments, not other city employees, making
it difficult for the city to explain why Welfare Department
employees couldn't also be exempted. Similarly, there were
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no logical criterion behind the city's decision to impose
its fifty percent rule on some issues and not others. In
any case the city's posture on the issue of non-bargain-
ability was to give the unions a strong propaganda issue.
The Mayor was not living up to his own Executive Order #49
which made it "the duty of New York -City to promote the
practice and procedures of collective bargaining." 1 6
Throughout the first fifteen days of negotiations
the administration refused to alter its "non-baraainability"
stance so on December 3 the SSEU membership voted "No
Congract - No work." They were prepared to strike on
January 4, the first working day of the new year, if their
current agreement, which was to expire on December 31
hadn't been renegotiated. The administration remained
adamant and threatened, in.the event of a strike, to invoke
the State Condon-Wadlin Act which outlawed public employee
strikes. On December 23 the SSEU began a 24-hour vigil at
the Municipal Building to continue until there was a con-
tract or a strike. On December 28 the membership of
Local 371 authorized its Board to call a strike "when it
feels that all avenues of bargaining have been exhausted." 
1 7
Both unions informed the administration that they were
prepared to strike. That same day Mayor Wagner suggested
that the unions and the city select a five-man advisory
arbitration panel to consider all issues. On December 29
the unions rejected Wagner's offer because such arbitration
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would not be binding on the city, but might be interpreted
as morally binding on them. The administration went to
court to prevent the strike. On Friday, January 1, Mayor
Wagner left for vacation in Puerto Rico and Supreme Court
Justice Irving Saypol enjoined the threatened strike, pend-
ing a discussion of the merits in court on Mondgy. That
Saturday, in separate mass membership meetings, both unions
voted to defy the injunction and on Monday, January 4, they
"hit the bricks" in a strike that was to last twenty eight
very long, cold days. 1 8
Both unions were well prepared. Preparedness appears
to have been as much a function of employee readiness to
have a confrontation with the administration and department
as it was a function of union skill in organizing for a
strike. Even if a good contract could have been nego-
tiated before December 31,. there might have been a strike.
Indeed, according to many of the leaders involved. they would
have been in trouble with their memberships if there hadn't
been a strike.19 No one wanted a repeat of the abortive
1962 strike threat. The membership understood the strike
issues. Reporters who interviewed random employees on
picket lines discovered solid membership support for the
union's negotiating position -as well as the unions and their
leadership. The result was an effective strike. Roughly
ninety percent of the caseworkers and supervisors parti-
cipated throughout the strike. The clerks, members of
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Local 371, but not included in this round of negotiations
(their's was a separate bargaining unit) honored the
picket lines in large numbers, over fifty percent staying
out the first week.2 0
Although the memberships of both unions stayed out
together during the strike formal intra-union relation-
ships were strained. Early in the mcnth the SSEU rejected
the idea of an outtight strike pact between the two unions
but did agree to negotiate an agreement in principle to
support each other's strikes against the department. As
far as the unions were concerned their two strikes hap-
pened to be running concurrently. This created some dif-
ficulties and on the 16th Local 371's Executive Board
authorized its leadership "to make any changes necessary
in its pact in negotiations with the SSEU without derivating
from the trade union principles embodied therein." 4 2 Dur-
ing the weekend of the 24th both unions pledged not to
settle separately and agreed to establish a Committee
for Joint Action to oversee picketing and other strike acti-
vities. The SSEU, however, refused joint leaflets or
picket signs. Throughout the strike each union kept one
eye on the other and one eye on the city. On February 1,
the day after both unions voted to end the strike, Local
371, in a leaflet entitled "This is Your Victory," reopened
its battle with the SSEU by announcing that Local 371 would
begin an immediate organizing drive among department
employees.
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On the other side, the administration appears to have
been caught by surprise. Its actions belied any prepared-
ness for a serious conflict. First the administration
publicly committed itself to invoking the Condon-Wadlin
Act. The Act, passed in 1947, prohibited all work stop-
pages by public employees and contained stiff penalties'for
those who did not strike. Under the Act striking public
employees could be reprimanded., suspended for up to two
months, demoted or dismissed upon a hearing before their
employer. If and when they returned to work they lost
their right to a pay increase for six months and had to
accept probation without tenure for one year. In addition
the Act stipulated that they must be penalized two days'
pay for each day they struck, up to a limit of thirty
days.22 By 1965 the Act had only been used in six of eighteen
possible situations, most of these outside New York City. 2 3
However, on January 1, before the strike began, the ad-
ministration took both Welfare Department unions to court
under the Condon-Wadlin Act and on January 5, the day after
the strike started, dismissed 5,398 workers for participa-
ting - the first time the Act's automatic dismissal clause
had been used on such a large scale.2 4 More were dismissed
as the strike wore on and the administration, despite the
reluctance of Dumpsen and Saypol, pressed for criminal con-
tempt charges against twenty two union leaders for continuing
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their illegal strike. By enforcing the Condon-Wadlin Act
and arguing publicly that it was legally bound to do so
the administration backed itself into a corner where it
could not withdraw its prosecution under the Act without
appearing to violate the law itself. This is hardly a posi-
tion an employer who expects to deal with a serious strike
places himself. Second, Mayor Wagner made some mistakes
that suggest either he or his advisors misjudged the new
leadership of both unions and the attitudes of their mem-
bers. His trip to Puerto Rico and continual refusal to
personally intervene in the negotiations certainly were
not diplomatic moves. In addition the Mayor went on tele-
vision four times to appeal to the union members over the
heads of their officers asking them to return to work. One
of these appeals was made on the same day that four union
officers went to jail for contempt under the Condon-Wadlin
Act: Each time he failed. A number of reasons for the
Department of Labor's and the Mayor's brinksmanship and
lack of diplomacy have been advanced. They may simply not
have believed that their once-friendly relations with Wel-
fare Department unions could haveuchanged so drastically.
Or they may have thought that this was a battle they could
win in the long run because the public would not react
violently to a strike which only hurt welfare recipients;
or because they thought the recent jurisdictional dispute
in welfare had left the two unions weak, disorganized and
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unable to work together. In any case neither the Depart-
ment of Labor nor the Mayor's office had ever negotiated
a collective bargaining contract nor dealt with a union
which insisted on bargaining in that manner. They'd also
never been confronted with a public employee strike. They,
like the young leadership of Local 371 and the SSEU, had
to learn. 2 5
The strike itself revolved around two issues not
included in either of the unions' October bargaining
packages. The unions refused to return to work until the
administration agreed to suspend all Condon-Wadlin penalties
and agreed that all issues were appropriate for Collective
Bargaining. Until January 30 these two issues eclipsed
all others and prevented attempts at a settlement. The
strike dragged on for four weeks amid a bewildering complex
of events while various parties attempted to mediate a
settlement. On January 7 the AFL-CIO Central Labor
Council (CLC) worked out an advisory arbitration formula
with Wagner which on the next day it recommended the
unions reject when Wagner announced that he reserved the
right to refuse to negotiate on some of the recommendations
a panel might make. After that Wagner announced on sepa-
rate occasions that he would enter negotiations personally,
accept advisory arbitration or accept fact-finding if the
unions would first return to work and accept Condon-Wadlin
Act penalties. Local 371 and the SSEU refused and the
Deans of New York City's Schools of Social Work began to
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work behind the scenes to effect a settlement. George
Meany even came to New York tordiscuss the situation with
the CLC and probably call Wagner. Wagner increased the
pressure for a settlement. On January 20, nineteen union
leaders were fined $250 and three of them sent to jail.
On the 25th the other sixteen went to jail. The CLC
increased its support for the strikers. On January 18
8,000 union members demonstrated at City Hall and the CLC
began to collect money for a strike fund from its member
unions. On January 28 the CLC held a shop stewards'
meeting attended by 1,000 officials from fifty six loclas
to consider additional actions in support of the striking
welfare workers.26
The administration's use of the Condon-Wadlin Act
and its apparent refusal to engage in collective bargain-
ing during this period mobilized virtually unanimous union
support for the Welfare Department strikers. On January
13,the United Federation of Teachers, a fellow profes-
sional union of non-uniformed public employees, sent tele-
grams to Local 371 and the SSEU condemning the city's use
of Condon-Wadlir supporting the demand for collective bar-
gaining and defending the right of unions to be concerned
for the needs of those they serve (a reference to the union's
policy demands.)27 The city's insistence on enforcing the
Condon-Wadlin Act's penalties strengthened this support.
Judge Saypol periodically delayed court proceedings in
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hopes that the parties would reach an agreement, but the
city kept pressing.28 On January 12 Jerry Wurf, who had
returned to New York to handle Local 371's negotiations,
publicly charged Mayor Wagner with "union busting." Other
labor leaders followed suit. At a January 21 CLC meeting
virtually every major union official in the city attacked
the Mayor's use of the Condon-Wadlin Act. They were parti-
cularly angry about the jailing of union leaders. Some of
their criticism was directed personally at Mayor Wagner
who was sarcastically referred to as "that friend of labor." 3 0
These criticisms must have been particularly galling to
Wagner who depended upon labor's support in the up-coming
election.
With union support came liberal political support for
the strikers., After the Deans of the Schools of Social
Work and others understood the union's policy demands,
the strikers received support from professional and reli-
gious social welfare organizations and agencies. The NAACP
which, like the older black supervisors, originally objected
to the union's shutting down of welfare centers which
served black recipients studied the union's demands for
changes in the department and decided to support them.
Other civil rights groups did the same.31
On January 28 Wagner appointed a special Citizens
Task Force "to review and evaluate the present status of
the labor dispute in the City Department of Welfare -
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especially the issue or issues holding up agreement to re-
turn to work."32 By this time the committee of the Deans
of Schools of Social Work had worked out procedural
agreements for arreturn to work acceptable to both the
unions and the city on all strike related issues except
Condon-Wadlin penalties. It's probable that both parties
had already agreed to a solution to this problem, but
that the administration or unions or both wanted it to
come from a prestigious third party to save face. The
Task Force didn't meet until 3:00 p.m. on the 29th, and
issued its report the next day. To solve the Condon-
Wadlin problem the Task Force recommended that the city
support a union motion in court to suspend penalties under
the Act until a union challenge of its constitutionality
was determined by the courts. Both parties were to abide
by that determination when it was finally made.33 To solve
the bargainability problem. the Task Force recommended
the procedure already worked out by the Dean' Committee.
This procedure established a five-man advisory fact-finding
panel, one member to be selected by each union, two by the
city and a fifth by agreement, which would consider and
act upon all proposals originally and subsequently submitted
by the unions and the city in negotiations. The Deans'
Agreement also stipulated that the panel could make re-
commendations on long-range issues and that "good faith"
on the city's part would include action to remove legal or
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administrative impediments to the implementation of any of
the panel's recommendations. In the Deans' Agreement
the administration would also agree that its present salary
and classification plans were subject toimodification.34
The city agreed to accept recommendations of the TAsk
Force, including the Deans' Agreement, and on January 31
both unions, urged to do so by their leaders from jail,
Voted at membership meetings to do the same and return to
work. On February 1, the strike ended and the next day
Judge Saypol released the nineteen union officials from
jail.
On February 2,, the various parties chose their re-
presentatives for the agreed-upon non-binding Advisory
Fact-Finding Committee. The administration chose its
Budget Director, William Shea, and Theodore Lang, Chair-
man of the City Civil Service Commission and City Personnel
Director. DC 37 sent Paul Hall, President Seafarer's
International Union 35 (later to be replaced by Jerry
Wurf), and the SSEU named its President, Joe Tepedino.
Together they named Charles Schottland, Dean of the Graduate
School for advanced Studies in Social Welfare at Brandeis
University, impartial Chairman. The committee began its
deliberations on February 6 with an attack on the admini-
stration's labor relations policy and machinery by the
AFSCME representatives and concluded on March 4 with the
public release of a 103 page report by its Chairman. Al-
though the city was willing to accept Schottland's recommend-
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ations, the unions were not.
During the fact-finding process, the unions and the
city were unable to agree on wages and both unions objected
to the final compromise recommended by Schottland which in
most cases was several hundred dollars closer to the admi-
nistration's offer than their minimum demands. The unions
felt that these salary recommendations didn't sufficiently
compensate for the month's pay lost during the strike. They
also objected to his failure to recommend the institution
of paid overtime for all overtime work and his failure to
make his recommended advisory arbitration of grievances
mandatory ("shall" instead of "should"). The SSEU refused
to sign for additional reasons. The report failed to re-
commend the exemption of Welfare Department employees from
the Career and Salary Plan. Other ecommendations, although
sympathetic to the SSEU demands/were written in language
which the SSEU negotiators considered so inexact or per-
missive as to be virtually unenforceable as contractual lan-
guage. In his attempt to get the unions and the city to
reach an agreement Schottland made wide use of such
rhetorical devices as "should consider," "make diligent
efforts to," "as rapidly as possible " and "may," instead
of the mandatory "shall " or "it is recommended that."
These devices dominated the sections of the report on
collective bargaining, workload (including caseloads),
educational leave and salary differentials, Trainee title
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and job description changes, working conditions, transfers,
disciplinary procedures and grievance-arbitration. The only
mandatory recommendations made covered semi-annual clothing
grants for recipients, overtime for workers whose caseloads
exceeded sixty, Health and Welfare Fund prbvisions, case-
worker title changes, ten percent reserve staff and
union use of department premises. It did not sound good
to the SSEU.36 Schottland, however, did go out of his way
in his "General Statement" and in his introductory passages
preceeding each set of recommendations to support the SSEU
position on policy matters as well as its view of the
welfare system and the caseworker's role in that system. 3 7
During the next two years, according to Judy Mage,
his Report served "to create an atmosphere for positive
change in the Department."38 Although he failed to get
the opposing parties to sign Schottland was not unaware
of this possibility and appears to have written the Report
with this idea in mind:
It is the hope of the Chairman that the recommenda-
tions agreed upon herein will result in greater com-
petence and efficiency if adopted on the part of the
Welfare Department employees, improve working condi-
tions, encourage higher standards of personnel, and
above all, assist in developing a more wholesome
climate in which City officials, Welfare Department
administrators, and professional and non-professional
staff can cooperate in forwarding the programs of the
Welfare Department of New York City.3 9
It was unmistakably a document written by a professional
social worker. Had all of its recommendations been manda-
tory it would have mirrored the original SSEU Collective
Bargaining Program.
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Because the unions failed to sign the AdvisoryFact-
Uinding Report they still had to negotiate a contract with
the city. They proceeded to do so with the Report as a
guide. Although the Report was not legally binding on
either party, all parties in the dispute were, in the
union's words, "morally committed to implementing its re-
commendations" because they'd agreed to do so in the
Agreement which ended the strike and because the Report
had been made public.4 0 The resulting contracts were
almost exactly the same as the Report's recommendations
except that in a number of crucial sections, collective
bargaining, caseload and working conditions, educational
leave and salary differentials, TrAinee title and job
description changes, transfers and other vital areas, the
final contracts substituted "shall"'for the Report's
"should." In addition. specific time limits were set for
the implementation of certain contract clauses. Finally,
existing grievance machinery was to be maintained, as re-
commended, but the City agreed to ask the City Council to
amend the City Charter to that the Mayor, by Executive
Order, could refer grievances to an impartial arbitrator
whose decisions could be binding. 41
The final SSEU contract was a breakthrough for public
employee collective bargaining in the city. Its collective
bargaining clause provided for bargaining on all matters,
including those relating to policy:
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It is agreed and undetstood that the City or the City
Civil Service, as the case may be, shall bargain
with'the union in subsequent negotiations for a new
contract or a renewal or extension of the Present
Contract or salaries and salary grades, fringe
benefits and other prerequisites, promotions, time
and leave rules and pay plan rules and regulations,
workload, working conditions, change of titles, and
personnel practices pertaining to the titles in this
Contract.
On-'those matters which cAnnot be settled between the
Bu-cet-Director and--the' Fersonnel Director, or the
Comissioner and the union because of the necessity
for other official bodies to become involved, the
practice shall provide for complete discussion bet-
ween parties and an agreement which will result in
city action to seek approval from- these other bodies,
such as the State Department of Social WelTfare. The
purpose of this provision is to effectuate collective
bargaining on all legitimate issues involved in pre-
sently established areas for collective bargaining
and the city should take steps to put this provision
into effect and to eliminate its previous positions
of "not bargainable" or "not bargainable at this
forum" on-questions bargainable in the accepted
collective bargaining procedures such as salariec
changes of titles and numerous other such items.41
Although the two welfare unions' Contracts are identical
in most respects, the second paragraph above does not
appear in Local 371's Contract.4 3
The strike victory was complete. Both dontracts
even included clauses which required the administration to
review its entire labor relations policies. These clauses
obligated the administration to submit its collective bar-
gaining procedures and its Career and Salary Plan to
independent panels empowered to make public recommendations.
These panels would include equal city and labor representa-
.n 44tion.
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Final contract negotiations were not completed with-
out some difficulty. The city reacted negatively to the
union's draft contracts because theye contained deadlines
for implementation of some sections, something the
Schottland Report did not do, and because they altered the
language used by Schottland in some sections making it
more specific. On April 15 the SSEU staged a demonstra-
tion protesting the city's delay in coming to terms as
provided by the Fact-Finding agreement. On June 4 Local
371's contract was signed by the Mayor under the threat of
an AFSCME sit-in. On June 7 a number of SSEU members sat-
in the office of the Mayor's Labor Assistant. While they
were there negotiations for the SSEU contract were com-
pleted and then it was signed by the Mayor. This welfare
labor dispute which began with a demonstration in front of
City Hall ended eight months later with a sit-in at City
Hlall.45
The signing of the contracts in the first week of
June may have solved the strike's "bargainability" issue,
but the CondonLWadlin penalty ifsue had yet to be solved.
On February 7' the welfare'Commissioner asked all employees
tho participated in the strike to sign a waiver empowering
him to impose the Condon-Wadlin Act's mandatory pay deduc-
tion penalty if and when the city decided to use it. The
unions instructed their members not to sign, but the threat
wat to hang over people's heads for thenext eighteen months.
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In August the State Civil Service Commission ruled that
all Welfare Department employees who had participated in the
strike, some 6,000, were ineligible for any state job. The
SSEU, Wagner, New York City Civil Service Commissioner and
the state President of the AFL-CIO all attacked the Com-
mission's ruling. At this point the Welfare Department
said that it would probably never hold the employee hear-
ings required by the Act - 6,000 hearings would take too
much time and effort. In December the State Supreme
Court upheld the Constitutionality of the Act. Although
the unions decided to appeal and the city agreed to a fur-
ther stay of the Act's penalties, the attempt to avoid the
Act's penalties switched from the courts to the State
Legislature. In February, 1966 the State Assembly passed
a bill exempting the city's transit workers, who struck
the day Lindsay became Mayor, from the Act's provisions.
The City Welfare workers were unable to get themselves in-
cluded in the transit worker's bill, but on February 23
their own bill passed the Assembly and went to the State
Senate. Both Lindsay and the President of the New York
City Council sent telegrams to the Senate Majority Leader
supporting the welfare worker's exemption from Condon-
Wadlin. Finally on July 6, 1966, after some extensive
lobbying, legislation exempting them from Condon-Wadlin
penalties for their January 1965 strike passed the Senate
and was signed by the Governor.4 6
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Despite these difficulties the SSEU contract and
strike were singular accomplishments. Among non-uniformed
employees in the city mayorality departments they led the
first successful strike and won the first percentage,
rather than step increase in pay, the first choice of
fully-paid health and welfare plans, the first collective
bargaining clause, the first transfer clause, the first
educational pay differential, the first specified workload,
the first clauses on hiring practices and reserve staff,
the first guarantees of union-management consultation
and the first real collective bargaining contract. When
the SSEU leadership and members realized their full impact
on the city they felt rather invincible. 4 7 But there were
going to be problems as they moved from an organizing to-
a representative union and as the forces they set in motion
reacted to their precedents.
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CHAPTER THREE
COMING OF AGE
In order to enforce their contract and prepare for
the next round of negotiations eighteen months hence the
SSEU leadership began to tighten the union's organization
and enlarge its membership. They developed strong center-
based chapters with active grievance workers, adopted a
militant posture in dealing with the department and estab-
lished efficient city-wide mobilization and communication
procedures. Finally, they determined to win the supervis-
ory bargaining unit from Local 371 in a representative
election.
Enlarging membership and maintaining leadership
continuity at the chapter level was difficult. Between
July 1965 and December 1966 caseworker turnover was still
high with one out of every three persons leaving every
twelve months. In addition the department was expanding,
necessitating large numbers of transfers from one center
to another. To handle the increasing number of case-
workers the department promoted experienced caseworkers,
many of the SSEU members, to supervisory positions - up
and out of the SSEU bargaining unit. To maintain its
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position in the department. the SSEU spent a significant
proportion of its organizing resources recruiting Trainees
into the union. This brought a number of people into the
union who had attended college during the height of the
Civil Rights Movement but were ignorant of working condi-
tions and salary levels in welfare before the 1965 strike.
They contributed to the SSEU's militancy, its client and
policy orientation and its willingness to strike in 1967.
The SSEU's organizing appeal to Trainees was similar to its
1962 to 1964 organizing drive against Local 371. In addi-
tion it emphasized the militancy and internal democracy
of the SSEU and the contractual rights won for Trainees,
ise. reduced caseloads during the six-month training
period and an increase in pay at the end of training. Most
importantly the SSEU offered its hope for the future, the
professionalization of the caseworker's job. This theme
runs through virtually every union activity during these
eighteen months.2 During this period the SSEU also organ-
ized the non-casework titles in its bargaining unit, Chil-
dren's Counselors, Home Economists and Homemakers. Again,
a major organizing strategy was to emphasize professionalism,
casework over clerk work. For instance, the union fought
for and got clerical aides assigned to Home Economists so
that in the words of an SSEU leaflet, "much of the burden
of clerical work will be removed from the Home Economists,
permitting them to carry out their true functions as con-
sultants to staff and clients."3 By December, 1965 the
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union had established chapters in every work location.
with titles represented by the union and had recruited
4,500 dues-paving members.4
Grievance chairmen were elected in each work loca-
tion, trained by the union and empowered to appoint corn-
mittees or assistants to aid them in their work. The
aggressiveness with which these chairmen pursued indi-
vidual and chapter grievances increased!chapter morale
and brought new members into the union. After the City
Charter was amended, as provided by the union contract,
to permit impartial arbitration of grievances in the final
step, the union used grievances to help enforce its con-
tract.5
During this period the SSEU assumed a mi litant stante
in virtually all of its dealings with the department and
the city. It sponsored numerous chapter and city;-wide work
actions and demonstrations or simply engaged in unexpected
behavior. At one point the SSEU convinced city inspectors
to inspect welfare centers for violations of building and
health codes. The union leadership argued that only mili-
tant staff action could create the necessary conditions for
welfare reform. A union leaflet distributed at a September
1965 American Public Welfare Association Conference read
in part:
It has been our experience that the sane arguments
of rational men are not, in themselves, enough to,
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bring about the long-overdue changes in public
assistance. Reasoned argument alone has failed to
persuade the controllers of the public purse to
invest the funds essential to any meaningful im-
plementation ?f the 1962 amendments to the Social
Security Act.
An unusually high proportion of the SSEU membership
and the staff it represented participated in union demon-
strations and work actions. By mid-1966 several hundred
individuals, Executive Board Delegates and Alternates,
Chapter Officers and Grievance Workerswere involved in
on-goi union activities. The SSEU leadership-could con-
tact these union activists directly to participate in a
particular work action or demonstration and/or to mobilize
others to do the same. The SSEU printed a monthly news-
paper and periodically distributed well-written, informa-
tive leaflets in every work location. Between June 1965
and December 1966 the SSEU distributed over 160 such
leaflets, more than one union communication with staff
every other working day. When something important happened
the staff heard about it that day or the next morning.
The SSEU became a major presence in welfare centers
throughout the city. Relentlessly it pushed the department
and the administration on a wide variety of issues in any
number of forums. Very little escaped the union's notice
or its wrath. At one point the union even threatened the
Department of Health with union picket lines and other
demonstrations if it didn't significantly speed up the pro-
cessing of birth certificates necessary for adoptive,
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foster and temporary child care placement. "In those
days," said Judy Mage, "we thought we could win anything."8
This activity took time to get off the ground. Staff
morale was low after the strike. Despite their resolution
not to work without a contract they had returned to work
without any of the issues in their Collective Bargaining
Program resolved. Fact-finding took a month and another
three months passed before a contract was signed. During
this four-month period staff received no increase in pay
and no contractual, hence no union, protection from dis-
missals and transfers. The union leadership didn't experi-
ence an immediate sense of victory either. They had failed
to eliminate the Career and Salary Plan. In addition
individuals who had participated in the strike had a
month's worth of work to catch up on and Condon-Wadlin
Act penalties to worry about.9 For these reasons vir-
tually no union activity took place fror February to June.
In late July there were two SSEU demonstrations and one
chapter work action against "summer overwork," covering
caseloads of workers on vacation. The contract's ten per-
cent reserve clause was designed to handle this problem.10
But it wasn't until September and the Iris Ascher case that
union morale improved. The Iris Ascher case perfectly fit
the SSEU self-image. It involved a contract-related indi-
vidual grievance, a chance to improve on the contract and
the Schottland Report, chapter militancy and initiative
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and action by clients in conjunction with staff. It's
the only incident during these eighteen months which
included all of these criteria but it came at the right
time for the union.
As recommended by the Schottland Report, the SSEU
contract reduced trainee status from twelve to six months
and provided for full caseworker status and pay at the
end of twelve months. But neither the Schottland Report
nor the union contract contained a corresponding reduction
in the eighteen-month probationary period before case-
workers could get Civil Service protection. Iris Ascher,
from all accounts a tough, intelligent, pro-client case-
worker in the West End Welfare Center, who was inclined
to berate supervisors who delayed her requests for clients,
was fired after seventeen and one half months on the job
for incompetence and carelessness. She had received two
satisfactory evaluations from her immediate supervisors,
one two weeks before her dismissal. The West End SSEU
Chapter sat-in the administrator's office to protest her
dismissal and petitioned the department saying that they
too were guilty of similarly incompetent behavior. The
SSEU supported the chapter and called for a September 19
noon-time demonstration in front of the center.
Before the 19th the local SSEU chapter distributed
leaflets in the surrounding community inviting recipients
to the demonstration. On the 19th almost 1,000 people,
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from that and other centers as well as clients from the
neighborhood, demonstrated in front of the West End Center.
They listened to speeches given from a sound truck provided
by the union. The Welfare Department over-reacted. First
it refused to reinstate Iris Ascher, then it condemned the
inhion for unethical use of clients and tried to prove that
Iris Ascher had been sleeping with another worker during
working hours:-- possibly in client apartments. The union
resurrected Ivan Denisovitch for the occasion:
Another (administrator) stood and pointed an
index finger at Ivan, 'your supervisor, Miss
Dooright, gave you an above average evaluation.'
'Isn't that qood?' asked Ivan.
'Good!' he shouted. 'Why immediately we knew that
you and Miss Dooright must be having an affair.
Our special investigators are at this moment can-
vassing your clients withsphotographs of Miss
Dooright to find out whether or not you used
their homes for your carrying on.'
'But Miss Dooright is sixty years old, sir,' Ivan
said.
'Its too late to be ashamed now, young man, you
should have considered her age before you acted.'1 1
Although the demonstration failed it increased staff morale.
In a pattern which would repeat itself throughout
1966 the SSEU took its case to another forum and eventually
won. When the Commissioner refused to overrule Iris Ascher's
dismissal, the SSEU took her case and the eighteen-month
probationary period to the City Civil Service Commission.
In early March of the next year the Civil Service Commission
ruled that the eighteen-month period was unnecessary and
could be abolished. The Mayor and State Civil Service
Commission agreed, and in piid-April the Welfare Commissioner
-64-
reduced the probationary period to twelve months. On May
27 the City Civil Service Commission ruled that Iris
Ascher was qualified for reinstatement and soon after that
she was rehired. She'd been working as a secretary for
the union in the meantime. It was a succes~ful action.
There were to be many more like it, but few with such
client-participation.1 2
The first in a series of major confrontations
between the department and the union over implementation
of the union's contract began in late January 1966. The
department ordered 250 caseworkers transferred from its
Chelsea and Special Services welfare centers to staff a
new Bureau of Health Care Services. The 1965 amendments
to the Social Security Act included Medicaid, a program
providing comprehensive medical services to welfare re-
cipients and other poor. New York City already provided
in-patient and clinic care free to medically indigent
residents in twenty one municipal hospitals and an equal
number of health centers. The administration intended to
use Medicaid to help pay for and expand these services.
The Department of Hospitals employed several hundred in-
vestigators who interviewed patients to determine their
eligibility for free hospital care or reduced fees. The
only qualification for these investigators, who performed
no other duties, was a high school diploma. In order to
obtain Medicaid matching funds and handle the expected
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influx of applicants under the new program the admini-
stration established the Bureau of Health Care Services
in the Department of Welfare. Employees of the new bureau
would work in the municipal hospitals and health centers
conducting eli'gibility interviews with little or no
follow-up, home visits or other forms of counseling. In
order to staff the new bureau the city planned to transfer
Hospital Department Investigators to the Department of
Welfare, upgrading them to casework titles and pay scales.
Caseworkers from Chelsea and Special Services who handled
the chronically ill and medical care for the aged were to
fill the additional jobs needed in the new bureau. The
SSEU exploded. The transfers from Chelsea and Special
Services violated the contract. They were neither volun-
tary nor in accordance with seniority. For caseworkers
the move constituted a major change in job description.
A February 2 SSEU leaflet entitled "Goodbye Caseworkers,
Goodbye Casework," predicted, "This could well be the
city's first step toward a general downgarding of the job
of all caseworkers." In addition. the SSEU opposed the
upgrading of Hospital Department personnel involved because
they did not meet Welfare Department Civil Service quali-
fications. In the Welfare Department, each unit super-
visor was responsible for five caseworkers. The Hospital
Department employed one Senior Investigator for every
two investigators. Sinee Senior Investigators were to be
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upgraded to Unit Supervisors over one hundred of the
transferred Hospital Department personnel would enter the
Welfare Department as supervisors. This, the SSEU argued,
would seriously reduce promotional opportunities for case-
workers. The SSEU charged that the proposed changes in
administration had not been negotiated in advance with
the union and demanded that the department cancel the
proposed changes in title and transfers until such nego-
tiations had taken place. Finally the union pointed out
that the Medicaid amendments required the provision of
certain services in return for federal reimbursement and
demanded the creation of a real casework job in the Bureau
of Health Care Services.
After a number of demonstrations and two weeks of
intensive negotiations the SSEU signed a compromise agree-
ment with the administration and the department on February
16. The caseworkers from Chelsea and Special Services
(but no caseworkers from other centers) would work in the
hospitals three and one half days a week for a period of
two months to help in the certification of Medical Assistance
applications. The union also agreed that as many as 300
Trainees could be similarly assigned to the hospitals to
do out-of-title work. During this two-month period the
city agreed to hire a sufficient number of Hospital Care
Investigators to handle the certification of applications
and, in consultation with the union, to develop and estab-
lish a caseworker title within the new Bureau of Hospital
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Services. After the two months elapsed the city agreed
to allow all caseworkers doing work under the agreement
to transfer to casework jobs in other welfare centers or
accept training for the to-be-developed caseworker jobs in
the hospitals. No caseworker would continue to do investi-
gative work. The agreement specifically preserved the
difference between caseworker and investigator titles
and contained provisions for training, working conditions,
supervision and union representation for those temporarily
assigned to the hospitals.
In April, at the end of the two-month period, the
department insisted that the transferred staff continue
their out-of-title investigative work in the hospitals.
They refused and returned 1,300 certification assignments
to the department. The next day the department returned
the cases and ordered the workers out into the field to
verify eligibility. They refused again, and the SSEU
called for a city-wide demonstration. The day before the
threatened demonstration the administration and the
department signed another agreement with the SSEU which
detailed the content of a new caseworker title which in-
cluded counseling, vocational guidance, assistance with
rehousing and other services. The agreement also pro-
vided for a training period and contained a city promise
not to punish workers who had refused to work as directed
in the preceeding days. On May 5, the department announced
the opening of 200 jobs that required caseworker qualifi-
cations in the Bureau of Hospital Care Services. 13
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Local 371 ended up representing the Hospital Care
Investigators (HCI's) and the SSEU the new caseworker jobs.
Initially the city had offered the HTC's to the SSEU.but,
after some internal debate about their compatibility with
caseworkers, the SSEU rejected the offer. The-HCI4-aswent
to Local 371 but the administration and the department con-
tinued to consider their duties similar to those of case-
workers. 14
The SSEU insisted throughout 1966 that its col-
lective bargaining clause gave it the right to partici-
pate in all department-initiated policy decisions. The
union further insisted that caseworkers were professionals
in the field of welfare, professionals with as much res-
ponsibility to their clients as to their employer, and
that the department should recognize and treat them as
such. The union's agressiveness when it came to fighting
transfers was not so much because transfers were used to
discipline staff, as before 1965, but because the union
maintained that worker/client continuity was necessary for
an adequate maintenance of support and meaningful provision
of services. Because caseworkers were the only department
employees who actually came in contact with clients, the
union argued that they should have the power to independ-
ently authorize certain services and additional grants.
The union fought for and won eeduced case consultation
and lowered levels of approval. The department, which
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rejected the SSEU concept of casework, ruled that the law
never intended for caseworkers to do anything but make
recommendations and continued to require at least one
supervisory signature on every authorization. The SSEU
engaged in a number of policy initiatives of its own. Of
particular concern to the city was the union's tendency
to link its conception of the caseworkers' role to contract
implementation issues during Labor Management Committee
meetings. The Committee's impartial chairman, Arthur
Stark, not an expert on welfare, appears to have allowed
these discussions to influence his arbitration of contract
implementation disputes. He accepted the union's argument
that rapid implementation of their contract's workload and
working condition clauses would reduce staff turnover and
increase the quality of services provided to recipients.
By doing so he minimized the department's arguments that
administrative problems and unique circumstances prevented
rapid implementation. Although the union succeeded in
winning favorable decisions it was generally unable to
force the city or the department to corply with Stark's
recommendations.
Throughout the year the department and the city con-
tinued to ignore certain provisions of the SSEU contract,
to ignore recommendations made during arbitration, to ignore
precedents set during grievance appeals and to ignore
special agreements concluded with the union. This attitude
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along with increasing caseloads during 1966 created a major
confrontation between the department and the SSEU.15
In September increasing workloads precipitated a
number of chapter work actions. In Brownsville all work
ceased when the union chapter selected a small group of
volunteers to handle emergencies. All other members re-
fused any work, including catching up on their own paper-
work or answering their own phones. Other chapters continued
to work but set quotas on the number of cases, pendings1 6
and intake interviews members would process. One chap-
ter returned all cases over the contractual limit to its
center director. The day after the Brownsville work
action the SSEU held emergency lunch-hour meetings in
every welfare center in the city. On September 8, the union
Executive Board met and recommended a work action in which
all caseworkers and Trainees would refuse to work on un-
covered caseloads except in cases of emergency, return all
cases,-over the contractual limit to center administrators,
keeping those in which emergencies were anticipated, visit
no more than one pending a week in order to discover pos-
sible emergencies and refuse to serve in Intake beyond
normal working hours. The Executive Board further recom-
mended that the proposed work action continue until the
department agreed to hire a minimum of 500 new caseworkers
a month, acquire additional office space where needed
immediately, establish caseloads at contractual levels
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with the remainder to be defined as uncovered requiring
only emergency service, extend or cancel all deadlines
falling due during the work action and pay cash overtime
to all workers who chose to work on cases over the con-
tractual limit, accept excess pendings or work beyond the
regular work day in Intake. If the department initiated
disciplinary actions against any employee participating in
the union work action any and all centers where such ac-
tion took place would strike until charges were dropped.
The SSEU President informed the Commissioner of the
impending work action, and on September 13 the union
membership adopted the Executive Board's recommendations,
voting to put them into effect on the 19th. The case-
workers would work, but only within their contract.
On the 19th 'caseworkers tied their excess cases in
bundles and physically returned them to the department.
The work action got full staff support in nineteen out of
twenty seven centers on the first day and twenty three out
of twenty seven centers on the eecond day as well as sym-
pathetic coverage and editorial support in the press. For
seven days the union would unilaterally enforce its con-
tract. Although the department threatened to reduce the
pay of every worker who took part in the work action it
announced on television that it would immediately hire any
college graduate who applied for a job. That week the
department, which had previously announced that it could
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train only 275 new caseworkers in September, hired over 400
and scheduled them to begin training the following week.
In all, the department hired over 600 new caseworkers in
September and 800 'in October. The union pointed out that
the new trainees would not be able to handle full caseloads
for another six months and on the 22nd voted to continue
its work action until the department agreed to pay cash
overtime for excess work. On September 26 the union signed
an agreement with the city to suspend its work action so
that the department could concentrate on hiring, acquire
additional office space and show good faith in implementing
the agreement. The department agreed not to deduct from
the pay of workers who participated in the work action and
not to return their excess cases to them. Instead. the
department would hire 500 new caseworkers each month for
the next three months and create a pool of uncovered cases
in each center to be handled by reserve staff and new
caseworkers only. The SSEU membership voted to ratify the
agreement and on the 28th the work action ceased. Neither
paid overtime nor the operation of the center caseload pools
were fully resolved in the ensuing weeks, but the conflict
moved from the welfare centers to contract negotiations in
17
November.
Not only were the caseworkers militant in 1966, so
were the clients. Mobilization for Youth (MFY), a federally-
funded' juvenile delinquency project working out of store
-73-
fronts on the Lower East Side, found that many of the
problems of the families it worked with were related to
welfare. Unable to handle these problems on an individual
basis without overettending themselves the MFY staff began
to organize groups of recipients to fight for their own
rights within the welfare system. By mid-year these and
other recently formed groups founded the City-wide Coor-
dinating Committee of Welfare Groups (Citywide) under the
auspices of the National Welfare Rights Organization
(NWRO). Although most of Citywide's major organizing
drives took place in 1967 and 1968, considerable recipient
protest activity went on in 1966. too. Demonstrations
occurred in a number of welfare centers and at the Mayor's
office.18 Initially both Local 371 and the SSEU wel-
comed the creation of client organizations.19
During the fall of 1965 a Community Action Committee
formed within the SSEU. It proposed to develop liaisons
between the union and federally-funded anti-poverty efforts,
recipient and tenants' right organizations and more tradi-
tional public and private agencies with programs designed
to assist the poor. The CAC published information on
welfare department policies and procedures for these organi-
zations and its members helped train these organizations'
recipient advocates. Citywide used CAC materials in its
leadership and grievance training programs.2 0 The CAC
compiled information on programs outside of the Welfare
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Department which might be of use to clients. It published
lists of these programs that caseworkers could insert in
their field manuals. Caseworkers were frustrated, CAC
members argued, because of the welfare department's in-
ability to solve problems of poor education, unemploy-
ment and discrimination. However, the intelligent referral
of clients, with proper follow-up, to programs which did
deal with some of these problems gave caseworkers a
chance to break the cycle of poverty for some of their
clients. A CAC leaflet urged caseworkers to combat client
apathy and despair by referring clients to community
protest groups where they might learn that positive
change was possible if they banded together and took
militant action. This CAC attempt to create tools
like its referral lists that expanded caseworkers' abilities
to provide services to their clients corresponded with the
union's demand for professionalization of the job. The
SSEU wanted caseworkers to have the authokity, flexibility
and time to provide specific services to clients as de-
fined by the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Acti
services intended to reduce dependency. However, they went
one step further. Union leaders from this period still
stress how important they felt it was to be able to perform
tangible services for clients, appearing in court as
character witnesses, locating adequate apartments, even
finding the cash necessary to get a musician's horn out of
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hock. CAC members and union officials worked together
to develop procedures that the department would agree to
for meeting recipient demands without putting more pressure
on workers so that they could expand the service role.
The CAC also proposed to dispell popular misconcep-
tions about welfare and welfare recipients in order to
create a more favorable climate for welfare reform and in-
crease the prestige of caseworkers. As long as the public
felt that recipients were lazy and dishonest, CAC members
argued, people who worked with them could not expect
increased pay and better working conditions. 2 3
The CAC predicted that its efforts would allay client
suspicions of caseworkers permitting an alliance between
the union and recipient organizations. In its column in
the SSEU News the CAC repeatedly argued that the welfare
system thwarted the effotts of caseworkers and clients
alike, changes which benefitted one were sure to benefit
the other. The union should provide client groups with
moral support, information and organizing resources. In
return, the CAC columns argued, client organizations could
provide valuable politic&l support for union demands and
tactical support during work actions, i.e. flooding
welfare centers to demand services and emergency grants
while the department was understaffed. Together, clients
and workers could transform the department,.creating the
necessary environment for a stable and professional staff. 2 4
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A Community Action structure developed parallel to
the union's center based chapter structures. Community
Action Committees formed, usually among younger union
members, in almost every welfare center. These CAC's
sponsored lectures by individuals working with poor peoples'
organizations in the city and urged their local union chap-
ters to become more involved in community activity. Ini-
tially CAC members were not union activitts. They parti-
cipated, but not as leaders, in union activities. However,
they had a program for union participation in community
affairs and their desire to carry that program out pushed
them into active union work. They began to run for union
office and by late summer and early fall of 1966 a sub-
stantial proportion of the SSEU Executive Board consisted
of people who had not been active in union affairs or even
department employees during the 1965 strike.25 Many of
these individuals came into the union through the CAC.
Younger, further left and more pro-client than the staff
as a whole, they tended to accept a broader definition of
the union's proper role in policy making than most other
union members and activists. Many of the elections which
elevated them to union office were heavily contested and
close.2 6 With their ascendancy the SSEU developed a re-
putation for policy-related activites. 2 7
Judy Mage, who became president of the SSEU in
February, 1966, received most of the credit from observers
for the union's militant struggle to enforce its contract,
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support of client organizations as a strategy to reduce
workloads and its insistence on procedural and policy
changes designed to increase the service aspects of the
caseworker's job. Indeed she deserved much of the credit.
In 1962 when she brought Manhattan into the union she
also brought a major concern for improving service to
clients and making the caseworker job more fulfilling. In
Brooklyn Joe Tepedino emphasized more typical union issues,
salaries and working conditions. The two meshed well.
Tepedino's concept of working conditions extended to the
nature of the job and Mage considered reducing turnover
by increasing salaries a prerequisite for improved
service. What became known as the "Mage faction" rarely
developed procedural or policy demands that were not also
workload related. They did this because the entire mem-
bership did not share their concerns and because they
couldn't justify such demands at the bargaining table in
any other way.28 The "Tepedino faction," although opposing
direct union involvement as extraneous to the purpose of
an effective union, welcomed the formation of recipient
organizations.2 9 Working conditions and salaries improved
after the 1965 strike. The tenants, welfare and civil
rights movements as well as the War on Poverty all re-
cruited political support for the poor among the college
educated, many of whom then came to work in the welfare
department. Although Joe Tepedino finally broke with the
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union after his defeat in 1966 because he "didn't want to
be associated with (Judy Mage's) policies,30 he had pre-
sided over an Executive Committee composed of "Mage"
people and the beginning of the CAC's during his last
year in office. The Mage presidency was the beneficiary
of a union finally ready to carry a continuing battle to
the department. She became president just as the union's
grievance machinery, communication and mobilization pro-
cedures, militant posture, chapter structure and member-
ship base became fully operational.
Although she encouraged their activities Judy Mage
claims to have been surprised that during 1966 CAC members
became so strong within the union Executive Board. 3 1 In
retrospect this development is not so surprising. Like
Tepedino and Mage, most union activists had joined the
union in 1963 and 1964 and worked through the campaign
against Local 371, the January strike, four months of con-
tract negotiations and the 1965 transforration of the union
from an organizing to a representative organization. They
had completed the work they set out to do and some like
Joe Tepedino felt tired. 3 2 However, union work throughout
1966 demanded increasing amounts of time and energy from
union activists. Newer members, like those in the CAC's,
had additional goals for the SSEU which made them willing
to engage in union work. Such people tend to end up in
leadership positions. The fact that "Mage" and CAC people
-79-
dominated the union's decision-making processes throughout
1966 would not have, in and of itself, created a problem.
The internal debate between "Tepedino" and "Mage" people
had always been one of emphasis. However, when recipient
organizations chose to attack caseworkers and the case-
worker's service role, the debate over union relationship
with client groups and its role in department policyz
making divided the union.
An early CAC document on organizing clients assumes
an organization primarily engaged in individual dlient
advocacy and appeal work with the caseworker's union
training some recipients and some caseworkers to handle
such work. The document also discusses picketing and
lobbying as additional activities a client organization
might engage in but remains vague as to what other forms
client direct action might take.33 Citywide's constituent
recipient groups (WRO's) did not follow this CAC model.
Citywide, like most NWRO groups, chose the existence of
special grants as its organizing tool. The department had
yet to develop regulations for the use of special grants for
clothing, furniture and household supplies. Citywide deter-
mined to force the department to develop minimum standards
for special grants. It would then depend upon its ability
to coerce approval for such grants out of caseworkers and
their supervisors during demonstrations to deliver benefits
to its members. Caseworkers would bear the brunt of these
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demonstrations because the centers in which they worked were
conveniently located in recipient communities. The Mayor,
the State Legislature and the Welfare Commissioner, although
responsible for welfare policy, were not accessible, nor
were they able to authorize special grants. Citywide
organized it's WRO's around welfare centers.
NWRO'made a strategic decision that since poor people
didn't vote or contribute to campaigns the only. lever they
had on the political system was the threat of disruption
and riot in central cities. If the organization could
sustain such a threat in enough cities, it might be able
to win significant welfare reforms at both the state and
federal levels. The promise of special grants convinced
recipients to participate in demonstrations and the result-
ing disruption of welfare centers kept the threat alive.
Citywide, in order to insure organizational continuity,
created a leadership and grievance structure which some-
what paralleled the client advocacy and appeal structure
envisioned in the CAC document mentioned above. However,
Citywide continued to concentrate its energies and resources
on organizing periodic demonstrations in welfare centers
for special grants rather than concentrating on individual
members' problems with the welfare system.
As if to add insult to injury, Citywide and NWRO de-
nied the validity or importance of services provided by
caseworkers to clients. "What" they asked, 'can a 23 year
old girl from Boston with a B.A. in English tell a mother
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about living in New York or raising a family?" Caseworkers
were do-gooders and patronizing to boot. NWRO wanted a
guaranteed annual income for all, enough money for people
to be able to choose what services they desired and from
whom. Until such a program passed local WRO's, not case-
workers, would build liaisons between recipients and various
public and private agencies with programs for the poor.
Until a guaranteed annual income replaced the existing wel-
fare system, caseworkers should make sure that recipients
received all of the benefits to which they were entitled.
Under existing circumstances, this meant increased paper-
work and less time for service to New York City's case-
workers. Judy Mage complained, "Service was not just a
matter of a higher grant - the WRO people never understood
this."4 Citywide told caseworkers that they could best
serve the interests of local WRO's by handing over lists
of recipients to facilitate organizing efforts and coming in
out of the field to authorize special grants during welfare
center demonstrations.
Citywide and the SSEU formed a few temporary coali-
tions around specific issues during 1966. The most impor-
tant concerned the semi-annual clothing grant included in
the SSEU contract. The department argued that the stan-
dard budget contained sufficient funds for clothing and
planned to discontinue the grant. On June 30 over 1,500
recipients participated in Citywide's first major City Hall
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demonstration demanding, among other things, an increase
35
of ten percent in the standard budget's clothing allowance.
The SSEU told Citywide about its contract and in mid-July
when leaders of Citywide met with a rppresentative of the
Mayor they had changed their demands to include implemen-
tation of the union contract, especially its semi-annual
clothing grant. 3 6 That fall, when Citywide organized
local WRO actions at welfare centers to support its demand
for a winter clothing grant, the SSEU offered its support.
These demonstrations coincided with the SSEU September~'work
action described in a previous section of this chapter.
CAC members continued to work with local client groups.
However, the basic approach of the SSEU and Citywide to
welfare remained incompatible and the resulting conflict
between caseworkers and recipients in welfare centers
continued.
Citywide continued to distrust the SSEU. In 1966
Citywide suspected that the union was only interested in
recipient support for its year-end contract negotiations.
That fall, when the union's Community Action Chairman came
to a Citywide meeting with mimeographed copies of only those
union demands relating to clients, not the whole Collective
Bargaining Program, they felt their suspicions were confirmed.
A Citywide organizer from this period has pointed out that
Citywide opposed most SSEU work actions because they closed
welfare centers, the recipients' only source of emergency
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assistance. Despite these difficulties the SSEU lead-
ership remained sympathetic to Citywide's demands and
demonstrations.
The SSEU rank and file did not always appreciate
this attitude. Criticism increased when caseworkers
discovered that some CAC members testified against other
caseworkers during client appeals. A case which upset
some caseworkers took place in November. Two weeks after
four WRO welfare center demonstrations the SSEU asked
caseworkers to juggle their schedules and paperwork so that
they could be in their offices during the next round of such
demonstrations. The SSEU instructed its members to process
immediately all requests for special grants they might re-
ceive that day. The Commissioner said that the union's
instructions violated department policy and threatened to
suspend any worker who followed them. The union threatened
to strike if he did so.38 These incidents precipitated a
debate within the union concerning its relationship with
clients and its involvement with policy matters.
While the SSEU was having these internal problems
its competition with Local 371 continued. Each took every
opportunity to criticize the other. These charges and
counter charges were not confined to events within the
welfare department. The SSEU attacked Loacl 371 for vari-
ous policies and positions adopted by District Council 37
and in return Loeal 371 attacked the SSEU for actions
taken by its allies, most notably the Sanitationmen. This
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conflict led to countless leaflets, union newspaper
articles, even special chapter meetings which drained
the energies and resources of both unions.
In 1966 the SSEU moved to take the supervisor's
bargaining unit from Local 371 in a representative elec-
tion. On July 1, when the SSEU published a Draft Bar-
gaining Program for Supervisors, organizing had already
begun. City Department of Labor regulations pro1hibited
jurisdictional elections during collective bargaining.
Petitions for elections in units whose contracts expired
December 31 had to be filed by August 15 so that the De-
partment of Labor could schedule elections before November.
On August 8 the SSEU filed signed petitions and membership
lists from over half of the supervisors requesting an
election. Fifty two days later the Commissioner of Labor
ruled the petitions invalid because they did not specifically
designate the unions involved. Within two days the SSEU
collected another 1,000 signatures, well over the 30% re-
quired, on a properly worded petition only to have them
rejetted by the Commissioner because it was after August 15.
The SSEU called for a demonstration in front of the Depart-
ment of Labor on October 11. Over 200 union members parti-
cipated. Twenty SSEU members, including Judy Mage, sat-in
to protest thds-department's refusal to schedule an election.
Twenty others joined them on the 13th, sat up housekeeping
in the Commissioner's waiting room and stayed until they
were arrested on the 18th. Their protest delayed the
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beginning of Collective Bargaining, a major problem for
Local 371 which had to negotiate a new contract before
its old one expired on December 31. Under Labor Depart-
ment regulations a jurisdictional election could take
place in the absence of a contract.3 9
Local 371 was in trouble. It could not count on
the supervisors and had yet to concolidate its base among
the clerks. The SSEU already included among its due-
paying members 700 supervisors.40 To hinder the SSEU
bid for the supervisors Local 371 filed for representative
elections among the caseworkers and homemakers. It failed
to get an election among the caseworkers, but the SSEU
did have to fight its petition. It succeeded in convincing
the Labor Department to hold an election among the home-
makers during the collective bargaining period, which it
then lost by over ninety percent. In 1964 the homemakers
had voted overwhelmingly to stay in Local 371.but had gone
to the SSEU as part of the caseworkers' bargaining unit.
After the 1965 strike the SSEU successfully recruited them
into the union. 4 1
Throughout 1965 and 1966 Local 371 waged two major
propaganda campaigns among the caseworkers against the
SSEU. The first called for "One Union in Welfare." Local
371 leaflets and organizers argued that in one union wel-
fare department employees would spend less time fighting
among themselves, could present a united front to the
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department and the city and might have won more in 1965
with less effort. Local 371 hammered away at the SSEU's
apparent inability to enforce its own contract.
Loacl 371 argued that a single welfare department
union, affiliated like Local 371 with DC 37, could easily
mobilize political and financial support available in
the city to insure contract implementation. Implicit in
Local 371's "One Union in Welfare" campaign was an attack
on the SSEU's independent status, its lack of affiliation
with any AFL-CIO union.
During this period a number of SSEU News editorials
and articles, many of them written by either Tepedino or
Mage, answered the "One Union in Welfare" slogan. They
argued that since 1964 caseworkers had learned that inde-
pendence was an asset, that they won when they relied on
their own strength and that independence improved union
responsiveness to members' needs. Because the SSEU col-
lected its own dues, controlled its own resources, rented
its own office space and hired its own organizing, research
and legal staff, it made its own decisions. Local 371, by
contrast, turned most of its dues over to DC 37 and
depended upon District Council organizers, lawyers and
researchers to do its work. To use DC 37 staff and to get
its political and financial support for work actions
Local 371 had to compete with other member unions for the
Council's attention. By surrendering its dues, Mage and
-87-
Tepedino argued, Local 371 surrendered political control
over itself to DC 37. While the SSEU Executive Board elected
its chief contract negotiations from the ranks of the
union, Local 371 had to accept whoever the District Coun-
cil selected. DC 37 had yet to select a chief negotiator
for Local 371 who had ever worked. in the welfare department.
Such an individual, they argued, would never fully under-
stand or support demands related to the professionalization
of the job. Within DC 37 caseworkers would always con-
stitute a professional minority and, like Local 371's super-
visors, find their professional concerns forgotten or ig-
nored. Finally they p6inted out that for eight years one
union, affiliated with DC 37, had actually existed among
welfare department employees, Local 371, and that in 1964
the caseworkers overwhelmingly rejected it in favor of the
SSEU. 4 2
However, the SSEU was not entirely content to re-
main unaffiliated. In December 1965 the SSEU invited
representatives of other welfare department employee unions,
most of them independents, to New York to discuss the pos-
sibility of creating a national organization. The meeting
led to a July convention in Chicago which founded the
National Federation of Social Services Employees (NFSSE)
with the following goals:
To promote the use of collective bargaining...
and foster the highest level of professional
standards among social service employees...
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To raise salaries (and improve terms of employ-
ment) commensurate with experience, responsibility
and education of sociail service employees...
To humanize the practices and policies of all
agencies...and insure that clients receive the
full extent of their legally entitled benefits...
To promote natinnal, state and local legislation
designed to further the goals of the Federation...4 3
Soon thereafter the SSEU membership ratified the Federation's
constitution and voted to join. By December 1966 the
Federation had ten member unions in six urban states,
California, New York, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and
Maryland. 4 4  Also that year the SSEU seriously considered
forming a joint alliance with the Uniformed Satitationmens'
Association (USA). John DeLury, President of USA, pre-
sented the case for an alliance at an October 31 SSEU
Executive Board meeting and received an enthusiastic wel-
come. Jack Bigel, one of DeLury's aides and an ex-UPW
member who left the department in 1951 to help found
Teamster's Local 237, also spoke. The plan fell through
when the SSEU realized that the USA wanted to dominate the
proposed alliance.45
The SSEU leadership found it much more difficult to
answer the second Local 371 propaganda campaign among case-
workers. Local 371 accused the SSEU of organizing the
clients who demnostrated against caseworkers in welfare
centers. Although the SSEU never actually organized clients,
it did support the goals of recipientr.organizations, provide
funds for buses and other organizational needs and make
the position of CAC chairman a salaried pffice. Some
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CAC people did work closely with local WRO's and the
uninn CAC Chairman did attend all Citywide Executive
Board meetings. 46 The union-did support Citywide's
fight for minimum standards, and when they won, did
print and distribute minimum standards lists to case-
workers - creating more paperwork. The union asked its
members to make the distinction between these activities
and actually organizing recipients. A number of case-
workers and supervisors who worked in offices where
demonstrations had taken place refused to see the differ-
ence.
Local 371 charged that the SSEU CAC activities
and policy-related initiatives revealedthat the union
leadership intended to go to the bargaining table with
demands that only affected clients, that it intended to
use dnion strength and union resources to support demands
that didn't affect workers. In response, the SSEU argued:
We believe that welfare must develop services and
make them available to every recipient. Only then
will the casework process in welfare produce re-
sults. Only then will our jobs be meaningful.
The SSEU is on record as a professional union
dedicated to changing the job both in salary and
content.41
To caseworkers this rebuttal must have lacked the force and
clarity of Local 371's attack:
Local 371 is a trade union...We believe that all
the resources and personnel of our union should de-
vote themselves solely and exclusively towards the
interests of our membership, and not for the interests
of client groups...To those of you who believe that a
trade union should devote itself exclusively and
solely to your interests - the interests of staff,
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and who believe all union perjnnel should work only
for you, then join Local 371.
Judy Mage admits that Local 371's position found acceptance
among some members, "We began to lose the loyalty of a
certain chunk of the staff." Some union members suggested
that if they'd really wanted the supervisors, their com-
munity action activities were ill-timed.4 9 However, leaders
of Local 371 at the time claim that the SSEU would have
50
won a jurisdictional election among the supervisors.
This is a moot point. The Commissioner of Labor
refused to reverse his ruling and the election never took
place.
As if all these problems weren't enough, a number
of other developments in 1966 made it harder for the SSEU
to enforce its contract.
During the 1960's welfare caseloads increased drama-
tically throughout the country. Nowhere did they increase
more than in the cities of the Northeast. Francis Piven
and Richard Cloward show that the bulk of that increase
took place in the latter half of the decade, a virtual
"explosion" in the relief roles. Between December 1964
and February 1969, the period of the SSEU's existence as
an independent union, the AFDC caseload alone in New York
City increased from 81,000 to 192,200 families. 5 1
The administration of the New York City Welfare
Department, understaffed like most other city welfare
departments, simply couldn't cope with the increase. The
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more caseworkers they hired, the more they needed. The
1,200 caseworkers they hired within two months of the
1966 SSEU September work action didn't begin to stabilize
caseloads near the contractual limit of sixty. In October
1965 the department had authorizations for eleven new
welfare centers and predicted that it would need an addi-
tional six the following year for a total of seventeen
new centers. Locating sites and getting approval from the
Board of Estimate took time, and by October 1966 the de-
partment had yet to open a single new welfare center.
They had, however, started work on thirteen, three to
open later that fall and ten during the following year.5 2
If they'd hired enough caseworkers to reduce caseloads be-
tween June 1965 and December 1966 they wouldn't have had
anywhere to put them.
On January 1, 1966 John V. Lindsay became Mayor of
New York City. lie did so with the support of the city's
Black and liberal communities and without significant
help from labor. lie had had little experience with labor
as a Congressman and New York's labor leaders had had little
experience with him. After twelve years of friendly rela-
tions with Mayor Wagner they were thoroughly prepared to
distrust a Republican who owed them nothing. After suffer-
ing through a thirteen day transit strike which commenced
the day that he took office Lindsay was not likely to be
-92-
friendly toward militant public employee unions, especially
a union in welfare whose insistence on enforcing its con-
tract, signed by the previous administration, hindered his
attempts to institute reforms designed to benefit the
Blacks in his electoral coalition.
In 1966 -when the courts certified its 1965 election
victory in the city Hospital Department among clerical
and aide titles, District Council 37, AFSCME, became the
majority union among mayorality department employees. 5 3
From all accounts Lindsay relied heavily upon Victor
Gotbaum, Executive Director of DC 37 and one of the few
dity labor leaders friendly toward his administration, for
advice on labor matters. Local 371 and SSEU leaders agree
that this relationship undoubtedly contributdd to the
SSEU's inability to force the City Labor Department to hold
a representative election among welfare department super-
visors, affiliated with AFSCME.
In June of 1966 Lindsay appointed Herbert L. Haber
Director of Labor Relations, a new city office. Haber
had the responsibility for coordinating all administration
collective bargaining efforts and the authority to screen
all agreements before they went to the Mayor f6r his sig-
nature. Previously the city Budget and Personnel Directors
and Labor an1 Civil Service Commissioners had shared these
powers.54 Haber's appointment and power gave Gotbaum one
individual with whom he could work out the details of changes
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in city labor relations policy approved by the Mayor.
Haber turned out to be a very tough and able negotiator.
In 1966 Lindsay faced the expiration of contracts
involving 115,000 city employees and, not wanting A repeat
of his experience with the transit workers, made reform
of the city's labor relations policies and machinery one
of his top priorities. He urged the committee of labor,
city and neutral representatives established by Wagner
under the 1965 SSEU contract to complete its review of the
city's existing labor relations procedures and submit its
recommendations for an alternative structure.55 Victor
Gotbaum chaired the committees' caucus of labor represen-
tatives. The SSEU was not involved. In March the
committee submitted its recommendations in what became
known as the Tri-Partite Agreement, and Lindsay accepted
them. Tri-Partite would institutionalize AFSCMEis ascen-
dancy among Mayorality department employees and severely
limit the scope of collective bargaining already enjoyed
. 56by some city unions.
Tri-Partite limited bargaining on overtime, time
and leave rules, pensions and other items covered! by the
Career and Salary Plan to employee organizations or groups
of organizations representing more than fifty percent of
all Career and Salary Plan employees. Among its
combined locals District Council 37 already represented
more than fifty percent of such employees. This regulation
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gave it a powerful organizing tool, only it could negotiate
for these benefits. In the Welfare Department this meant
that while Local 371, affiliated with AFSCME1 could
participate in negotiations on behalf of ite members for
these items, the SSEU could not. Tri-Partite established
an independent Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) to
resolve disputes about the intent of its regulations, deter-
mine collective bargaining units and certify collective
bargaining agents. The OCB's governing board would con-
sist of two representatives from labor, two from the city
and three mutually acceptable impartial members. Although
all city employee unions wou1,d come under the OCB's juris-
diction only unions which signed the Tri-Partite Agreement
and agreed to abide by its regulations could become members
of the Municipal Labor Committee (MLC) which had the power
to choose labor's representatives on the OCB Board. Since
AFSCME dominated the group of unions which helped write the
Tri-Partite Agreement and since that group became the
original MLC under the Plan, AFSCME would control labor
representation on the OCB, permitting it to influence more
than any other union, its important bargaining unit deter-
mination and agent certification decisions.
The Tri-Partite Agreement limited the scope of col-
lective bargaining by specifically excluding a long list of
management prerogatives from the negotiating table:
It is the right of the city, acting through its
agencies, to determine the standards of services
to be offered by its agencies; determine the standards
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of selection for employment; direct its employees;
take disciplinary action; relieve its employees
from duty...for legitimate reasons; maintain the
efficiency of government operations; determine the
methods, means and personnel by which government
operations are to be conducted; determine the con-
tent of job classifications; take all necessary
actions to carry out its mission in emergencies;
and exercise complete control and discretion over
its organization and the technology of performing
its work. The city's decisions on these matters are
not within the scope of collective bargaining, but,
notwithstanding the above, questions concerning the
practical impact that decisions on the above matters
have on employees, such as questions ot workload and
manning, are within the scope of collective bargain-
ing. Assignment of employees to duties substantially
T ferent from those stated in their job classifica-
tions may be the subject of grievance procedures.5 7
For the SSEU, this clause meant no contractual clauses
regarding Senior Caseworkers, dismissals, suspensions or
transfers, labor-management committee negotiations on im-
provements in welfare department procedures and policies,
caseload limits or reserve staff and no protection against
out-of-title work. The intent of the practical impact
clause (underlined above) was not clear. It was clear,
however, that the OCB would overrule any attempt by the
SSEU to bargain around the above issues. If the SSEU
signed the Tri-Partite Agreement this one paragraph can-
celled its existing collective bargaining clause and made
its concept of professional unionism virtually impossible
to carry out. 5 8
In effect Tri-Partite eliminated one of the major
causes of public employee unrest identified by Department
of Labor staff during Wagner's administration. Wagner
tended to grant a large number of bargaining certificates,
over twenty in the Welfare Department alone.59 Raymond
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Diana, who worked for Wagner in the Department of Labor,
described the effect of creating many rival unions in
each department:
In my nine years, almost every strike or threatened
strike was because of inter- %or intra-union rival-
ries. Factions or rival unions had to prove their
courage so they threatened a strike. Then the city
has a problem, whatever the reason, a strike is a
strike. The city can compromise on dollars and
cents, but you can't compromise principles - es-
pecially if the city's principles aren't even in-
volved.60
Tri-Partite solved both problems. It created the possibility
for one union to become dominant, a union which over the
years had remained internally stable, and restricted bar-
gaining to financial matters. That fall the Patrolman's
Benevolent and Uniformed Fireman's Associations agreed to
submit to arbitratinn a number of workload demands, one
of which involved the manning of patrol cars and fire en-
gines. Both unions had signed the Tri-Partite Agreement
and agreed to negotiate within its regulations and both
agreed that the arbitrator should rule on the bargainability
of workload and manning issues under Tri-Partite. The
arbitrator, Peter Seitz, an original member of the Tri-
Partite committee, ruled that workload and manning decisions
belonged exclusively to management and therefore were not
bargainable. However, he ruled that the effects of manage-
mant decisions were bargainable under the "practical impact"
clause and that unions could seek compensation for such
effects in the form of increased wages, overtime and reduced
hours at the negotiating table.6 1
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On April 28, 1966 the SSEU organized a coalition of
nine minor unions, Teamsters Local 237 and itself, represen-
tihg approximately 30,000 city employees, to oppose the
Tri-Partite Agreement. This coalition, the United Committee
for Collective Bargaining (UCCB), and the Uniformed Sani-
tationmen's Association (USA) constituted labor's major
opposition to Tri-Partite. Others either ignored or supported
the Agreement. Unions representing over 100,000 employees
signed the Agreement. Some thought that a loose alliance
of unions built around the SSEU and the USA could eventually
compete in membership and strength with Disttict Council 37.
On June 1 the UCCB sponsored a demonstration at City Hall
of between 4,000 and 8,000 city employees. After this
show of force they succeeded in delaying City Council
action on those parts of the Tri-Partite Agreement requiring
its approval. The Mayor planned to institute the rest
by Executive Order. In the long run they failed. The
Office of Collective Bargaining began operation on September
1, 1967. After the June 1 demonstration, however, Lindsay
abolished the existing Career and Salary Plan and began pre-
parations to replace it ~with a more equitable one.6 2
One other change took place in 1966 which also ad-
versely affected the SSEU's ability to enforce its con-
tract. In February Lindsay appointed Mitchell I. Ginsberg,
an Assistant Dean of the Columbia School of Social Work,
Welfare Commissioner. At first the SSEU welcomed the
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appointment of a liberal professional and Ginsberg indi-
cated his sympathy with the SSEU's desire to reform the
welfare system. This relationship deteriorated rapidly.
Ginsberg waited for the results of a number of experiments
with new procedures taking place in some welfare centers
and instituted some experiments of his own. The SSEU
opposed the delay. It told Ginsberg that if he wanted to
improve services to clients he should implement the union's
contract and expand some of the experiments to the rest of
63
the department without delay. WVith some of his administra-
tive changes thwarted by union activity, especially' the SSEU's
opposition to transfers, Ginsberg began to complain that
"labor-management contracts cannot be the vehicle by
which reform in public welfare is accomplished."6 4 In
November when the SSEU issued its own guidelines to
caseworkers on what to do during recipient demonstrations,
Ginsberg charged that the union was "attempting to arrogate
to itself the authority of administering the Department."65
Ginsberg undoubtedly opposed the caseworker's concept
of themselves as professionals. Throughout the 1960's
social work professionals resented the public's tendency
to call welfare department caseworkers "social workers."
Many state National Association of Social Workers chapters
submitted legislation to limit the title "social worker"
to people with professional credentials, Masters or
Obctoral degrees in Social Work.
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For the SSEU, then, 1966 meant continual struggle.
Its contract implementation fight, conflict with Local
371, internal conflict over community action, opposition
to Tri-Partite and change from an organizing to a repre-
sentative structure exhausted its human and financial re-
sources.
The city, supported by Tri-Partite, never really
gave up its argument that the SSEU threatened managerial
prerogative. The department viewed the union's contract
"as a statement of goals" and when Haber took offiue, he
cAlled it "impossible and unrealistic." 6 6 In a 1966
interview, Anthony Ruffo, a Department of Labor represen-
tative present during many of the administration's con-
frontations with the SSEU, argued that collective bar-
gaining was a privilege granted by the city, that the city
was not legally compelled to bargain and that it could not
be compelled to comply. Indeed, he argued, it could
nullify such a- contract at any time. The city would try
to implement its labor contracts, but was under no obliga-
tion to do so.6 7 As early as July of 1965 Wagner had
threatened to break the SSEU contract if its "insubordina-
tion" continued. 68
Whatever their rhetorical positions neither Haber,
Lindsay, Ginsberg nor Gotbaum had any reason to aid the
SSEU, in fact it was in their interest to oppose it. They
appear to have thwarted it at every opportunity.
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The city began November 1966 contract negotiations
by refusing to bargain outside of the provisions of the
Tri-Partite Agreement and demanding the exclusion of all
provisions of the 1965 contract which conflicted with
Tri-Partite from any new contract. The SSEU entered the
negotiations determined to exclude itself from Tri-Partite.
Its Collective Bargaining Program included contract enforce-
ment clauses with penalties for non-implementation and pro-
visions which, if enacted, would substantially alter some
welfare department policies and procedures.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE 1967 STRIKES
The changes discussed in the previous chapter altered
the SSEU's relationship with the labor, political and
professional forces which contributed so significantly
to the union's 1965 strike victory.
In 1965 the SSEU received unanimous labor support
during its twenty-eight day strike for three reasons:
the participation of an AFL-CIO affiliate (Local 371); the
administration's apparent refusal to engage in collective
bargaining; and the city's use of Condon-Wadlin Act penal-
ties. By January 1, 1967 both Local 371's clerical and
supervisory chapters had signed contracts with the city.
These contracts which contained Tri-Partite's management
prerogative and anti-strike clauses took Local 371 out of
any strike discussions. The contract's existence prevented
the SSEU from raiding the supervisors to increase its
strength. The majority of AFL-CIO unions felt that the
labor relations machinery proposed under Tri-Partite and
already informally adopted by the city's Office of Labor
Relations satisfactorily resolved the three major prob-
lems which created the 1965 crisis.
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In 1965 the city had no single agency responsible
for labor relations or contract negotiations. By 1967
the city's Office of Labor Relations coordinated these
duties and planned to do so until replaced by the Office
of Collective Bargaining proposed under Tri-Partite. In
1965 the city had no impartial impass procedures. The
unions refused to accept the argument that Department of
Labor personnel and other city employees like the Personnel
Director and Civil Service Commissioner used extensively
by the city in mediation were truly neutral parties.
They owed their allegiance to the Mayor. By 1967 the Dir-
ector of Labor Relations agreed to use mutually agreed-upon
third parties in mediation, fact-finding and arbitration
as suggested by Tri-Partite until similarly impartial
procedures under the Office of Collective Bargaining went
into effect. In 1965 city unions, especially DC 37,
AFSCME, opposed the manner in which Wagner determined bar-
gaining units and granted representative certification.
The ease with which'the SSEU received recognition and dues
check-off privileges in 1965 angered AFSCME. AFSCME was
especially upset that the SSEU could collect dues from
supervisors even though it couldn't represent them at the
bargaining table.1 In 1965 and 1967 some supervisors actually
worked on the SSEU negotiating teams. The proposed Office
of Collective Bargaining would make bargaining unit and
certification decisions under regulations designed to pre-
vent such crossovers. In the meantime the Office of Labor
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Relations promised to abide by Tri-Partite's recommendations.
In 1967 Haber refused to negotiate with SSEU representatives
who were supervisors or to give them leave to participate
in negotiations. Most union leaders accepted Tri-Partite's
solutinn to the bargainability problem. They believed that
the SSEU's subsequent insistence on the bargainability of
all issues was beyond the scope of proper trade unionism.2
By 1967 the Condon-Wadlin Act was dead. Although its
replacement, the Taylor Law, would not go into effect until
September 1 the administration refused to invoke the
Condon-Wadlin Act for the remainder of its term.3 The
Taylor Law directed its sanctions at unions rather than
employees, providing for fines of up to $10,000 or one
week's dues for each day on strike and/or loss of dues
check-off privileges for up to eighteen months. Although
the new law retained possible penalties for striking
employees it only mandated punishment of union leaders,
fines of up to $250 and/or imprisonment of up to thirty
days. The remainder of the law's provisions were discre-
tionary. Under the law municipalities had to seek injunc-
tions and penalties against union leaders. The law's
provisions did not apply to New York City although they
did require the city to establish substantially similar
procedures and penalties under its Office of Collective
Bargaining.4 The administration would not invoke the
Taylor Law against its political allies, specifically
AFSCME, but would use the Law's provisions against the
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teachers and sanitationmen. Condon-Wadlin had not per-
mitted such discretion.
In 1967, then, the SSEU could only count on support
from unions opposed to Tri-Partite or the ascendancy of
District Council 37, the UFT, USA, TWU, and Local 237, IBT.
Without widespread union support the SSEU would also not
receive the same political support it had enjoyed in 1965.
Political support for the union in 1967 came only from a
few state legislators and two borough presidents, Herman
Badillo and Percy Sutton, who represented primarily Black
and Puerto Rican constituencies.
In 1965 the Deans of New York's Schools of Social
Work contributed substantially to the tone of the strike
settlement, fact-finding report and final contract. By
1967. the professional attitude toward public assistance
had changed and the Deans chose to support their colleague,
Welfare Commissioner Ginsberg. In 1962 social work pro-
fessionals told Congress that a humanistic approach to
rehabilitation, individual family counseling and referral
by caseworkers with the provision of comprehensive services
to clients, would best serve to put recipients back on
their feet and into the work force. Congress agreed and
the 1962 Amendments to the Social Security Act included
financial incentives to states to provide such services.
In 1967, faced with rapidly rising AFDC caseloads, Congress
reversed itself, emphasizing concrete services to recipients
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willing to work, establishing a compulsory training pro-
gram for certain recipients and freezing AFDC reimbursement
to states at current levels. The professionals also aban-
doned the coordinated services strategy for reducing de-
pendency and began to emphasize manpower training and
income maintenance instead.5 They looked for ways to
improve the welfare systems income distribution procedures
rather than its provision of services. The Deans no longer
supported the SSEU's emphasis on the provision of personal
services to their clients. Ginsberg began separation of
service and income maintenance experiments in one welfare
center, which the SSEU opposed, and later would lobby vigor-
ously for Nixon's Family Assistance Plan as a foot-in-the-
door for income maintenance.6
Finally, unlike 1965, in 1967 the SSEU had neither
surprise nor solidarity on its side. Since 1965 the ad-
ministration had learned that it could expect almost any-
thing from the SSEU, but in 1967 it knew that the super-
visors and clerks were not going to strike. Based on its
experience in 1965 when it was able to get recipient checks
in the mail without the help of most department personnel,
the administration must have known that if only the case-
workers went out in 1967 it could keep welfare centers open,
handle emergencies and mail out checks without much diffi-
culty. Thoughout 1967 personality conflicts and faction-
alism exacerbated the internal debate over client organization
begun in 1966 within the SSEU and some leaders, worried about
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Condon-Wadlin and the ability of the union to carry out a suc-
cessful strike, wanted to drop some of the union's policy-
related demands.
Considering the changed political and labor relations cli-
mate in the city, the SSEU's 1966 Collective Bargaining Program
reveals a complete unwillingness on the part of the union to
accept either Tri-Partite or the Seitz arbitration. The le-
gal-sized, 110-page document contains extensive policy, work-
load and manning sections. Although built on its 1965 Collec-
tive Bargaining Program, the Schottland Report and its 1965
contract the 1966 Program also reflects the union's contract
implementation experience. During 1966, for instance, the
union felt compelled to take hiring quotas and recruitment
ideas to arbitration in order to force the city to implement
its sixty caseload limit and ten percent reserve staff clauses.
The 1966 Collective Bargaining Program called for the inclusion
of such matters in the contract. During the summer the union
established committees in each welfare department bureau
(Special Services, Public Assistance, Child Welfare, Health
Services) to formulate demands peculiar to the nature of the
caseworker's job in each bureau. The appropriate union offi-
cers or committees wrote the special sections on grievance,
transfer and other procedures. A separate union committee 're-
viewed departmental policies and procedures and wrote the
union's policy or professional demands. Another union com-
mittee concentrated on salaries, differentials, pensions and
other financial benefits.8 The union also emphasized
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protection issues. The resulting document was both com-
prehensive and specific. Here a few examples will suffice.
The proposed contract would require the administration to
enter negotiations with the FHA for the construction of 221
(d) (3) housing in return for which the welfare department
would promise to cover down-payments, maintenance and other
fees for recipients. It would require the department to
establish a union-management committee to review all wel-
fare department forms and recommend changes, hire 500
new caseworkers each summer and 700 new caseworkers each
month, relocate eleven welfare centers and renovate four,
establish new day-care centers and open a boarding house
for unwed mothers. The department would have to hire
consultants to iron out the bugs in its Electronic Data
Processing experiment by April 1, 1967 and expand it to
cover all welfare centers by January 1, 1968. To reduce
workloads the department would pay recipients actual
utility costa and a telephone allowance, provide semi-
annual clothing, household supply and furniture grants
and bring recipients' standard budgets up to the federal
poverty level providing a yearly cost of living increase
thereafter. For caseworkers the union demanded a $1,600
salary increase, tighter transfer procedures, specific
workload guarantees, additional pay differentials and
fractional pay (a caseworker with a caseload of seventy
eight, twenty percent over the contractual limit, would
receive a twenty percent increase in pay) as well as
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increased overtime compensation. The union pointed out
that the city only paid one eighth of their salaries with
the federal and state governments picking up the tab for
the rest. The contract included everything from the type
of wiring in welfare centers to length of time requests
for household replacement items could be delayed. 9 The
union supported each demand with a brief explaining how
that demand would affect recipients and caseworkers.
In its leaflets and other-communications with members
the SSEU did not emphasize its professional demands.
Instead, it emphasized its wage, transfer, senior case-
worker (an advancement opportunity) and salary differential
demands. In its introduction the committee which developed
the professional demands for the union argues:
According to the department's advertising "A
career in Social Service awaits you as a case-
worker with the NYC Public Welfare Program." Yet
the most pervasive and persistent conditions under
which NYC Department of Welfare caseworkers must
do their jobs prevent fulfillment of that pro-
mise. Perhaps the most inescapable for the case-
worker is the unspoken but obvious hatred and mis-
trust his clients feel toward him. A close second,
however, is the constant knowledge that not only
is he not able to provide meaningful help or ser-
vice, but he is usually engaged in time-consuming
and unrewarding activities, which his clients can
only perceive as harras ment and which intensify
the unspoken hostility.10
In its cover letter to Judy Mage the committee makes a
somewhat different argument:
By adopting this, the union can put the city on
the defensive for once. We will be truly in
the forefront of one of the most progressive
movements in the country. And have the effect
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of placing the whole issue of managerial prero-
gatives in a new light. This is a challenge to
the city and the Department to be truly flex--
ible. li
Judy Mage explained that in the early days the union's
approach to its membership was direct. "Tepedino felt
that the truth was effective and that the union shouldn't
lie or exaggerate. He didn't think how the failure to sign
the fact-finding Report in 1965 would affect membership
morale. By 1967 issues were much more numerous and com-
plex and we spent much more on how-to interpret events to
the membership."12
The administration responded to the SSEU 1966
Collective Bargaining Program with its own demands that the
union sign Tri-Partite's no strike - no work action and
management prerogative clauses. The ddministration de-
manded that the union agree to drop its transfer and case-
load contract provisions in favor of language which made
them discretionary rather than mandatory. It also demanded
that the union drop its all-inclusive collective bargaining
clause and accept memoranda from the Commissioner on
changes in workload, manning, working conditions and
other areas. The Commissioner, the administration said,
could discuss these and issues of policy-and procedure in-
formally with the union. Such discussions could result in
non-binding committments to resolve differences. Finally,
the administration offered to discuss the establishment of
a Caseworker Assistant title requiring only a high school
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degree. The administration failed to make its own wage
offer, refused to ne-tiate most demands prohibitted by
Tri-Partite and threatened to end negotiations by invoking
arbitration before the SSEU had even presented all of its
demands.
On December 16. the SSEU Executive Board authorized
its leadership to call a strike on January 3, the first
working day of the new year, and the union began a "Save
Your Money" campaign. On December 21 over one thousand
SSEU members demonstrated in front of the main offices of
the Welfare Department. After the demonstration the admi-
nistration agreed not to invoke arbitration and agreed to
negotiate on a daily basis. The Commissioner joined the
negotiations for the first time. On December 27 after
their negotiators explained that some progress had been
made, the SSEU Executive Board voted to extend their contract
and strike deadline until January 15. On January 11 over
1,000 SSEU members demonstrated again, this time outside
the New York City offices of the state Departme.nt of
Welfare. 13
In a message to members in early January the SSEU
President characterized the city's bargaining position as
one advocating "overwork and underwork." The union had
always argued that high staff turnover, still over thirty
percent, was a major cause of high caseloads and that the
department should in addition to increasing recruitment,
reduce paperwork and increase salaries, promotional
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opportunities and job satisfaction in order to keep
its caseworkers. The administration refused to discuss
working conditions, caseload limits and departmental pro-
cedures which might reduce workload, hence advocating
"overwork." Instead the administration offered to estab-
lish an Assistant Caseworker title to handle certain rou-
tine cases. Instead of the 1,500 Senior Caseworkers
demanded by the SSEU the city offered to hire 400 Senior
Caseworkers and 800 Assistant Caseworkers, with fewer skills,
less education, and less training than caseworkers, hence
advocating "underwork." The administration refused to
discuss caseworker recruitment quotas or caseload limits
for Assistant Caseworkers but would agree to a contract
clause promising that no changes in the department would
result in caseworker layoffs. Since turnover remained
high and since the city wouldn't promise to retain the
present ratio of caseworkers to caseload, Judy Mage sug-
gested that the administration was not only interested in
reducing the service role of caseworkers, but that it also
wanted to reduce the total number of caseworkers by re-
placing them with Assistant Caseworkers.1 4
In January the administration offered the SSEU
the same salary package negotiated for the Hospital Care
Investigators by Local 371. Local 371 had succeeded in
getting the HCI's moved into the caseworker salary grade
with a substantial increase in pay. The SSEU considered
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the offer an insult and on January 12, the SSEU membership
voted to strike beginning the 16th. Although negotiations
continued and the union, through Haber, received two
letters from the Commissioner agreeing to take action on
nine of the items included in the union's demands under
workload and manning and promising to improve recipient
housing, expand the use of data processing and reconstitute
the department's training program, the SSEU struck as planned
on the 16th. Between sixty five and seventy five percent
of the caseworkers participated in the strike. On the
evening of the 18th, the SSEU membership voted to return
to work, accepting the administration's offer of immediate
fact-finding on wages and fact-finding on all other un-
resolved issues after an additional week of.intensive nego-
tiations. Although the SSEU leadership pointed out that
they'd accepted the same offer, fact-finding on all issues,
after their twenty-eight day strike two years earlier over
one third of those present during the often stormy meeting
voted to continue to strike.15 The leadership didn't
say so, but it also knew that to successfully prosecute
a long strike the union needed ninety percent staff support
which they obviously didn't have.16 Throughout the year
the SSEU leadership had to balance union policy between the
more conservative quarter of their membership who didn't
want to strike and an equally large radical group who
wanted to strike until the city agreed to a contract. The
latter group attended Executive Board and membership
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meetings in force. 7
Negotiations and fact-fiiding began immediately
but Haber cut them off on February 7 because of a continuing
work stoppage by caseworkers at the Non-Residence Welfare
Center. Non-Residence had 2,500 uncovered cases in its
pool and an average caseload of fifty nine, nineteen over
the contractual limit. To bring the staff's workload
within reach of the union contract would have taken over
sixty five new caseworkers. On the 2nd, caseworkers at
Non-Residence refused to acdept any additional pendings
that week. The department suspended nine of them. The
next day most caseworkers as well as some supervisors and
clerks stopped work in sympathy. The depattment suspended
eight m6re. On the 6th the work stoppage cohtinuad with all
caseworkers reporting to their desks but refusing to work.
The SSEU held chapter meetings in all welfare centers to
discuss the situation at Non-Residence. On the 7th the
SSEU sponsored a noon-time demonstration in front of Non-
Residence to support the workers inside. The SSEU leader-
ship decided to support the work stoppage at Non-Residence
despite continuing contract negotiations and fact-finding
meetings because it had a strong local chapter there with
a large number of supervisory members. With this strength
the leadership thought it could win concessions from the
department that it couldn't win through a weaker city-wide
strike like the one in January. On the 9th the SSEU
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membership adopted a list of workload and manning demands
and voted to expand the Non-Residence work stoppage to all
welfare centers the following week if the department failed
to accept their demands. Over the weekend the administra-
tion and department met with the union in an attempt to
solve the Non-Residence crisis before it precipitated the
threatened work action. The union membership ratified
the agreement on the evening of the 15th. The department
agreed to hire 600 caseworkers a month until its contractual
obligations were fulfilled, assign two staff people to work
full-time on hiring and recruitment, purchase radio spots
and poster space on subways and buses to advertise open-
ings in the department, utilize the Commissioner's tele-
vision appearances to do the same, periodically review its
hiring figures and recruitment program with thenunion,
seek additional budget lines for staff if necessary and
begin immediate consideration of lowered levels of
approval, simplified overtime procedures and other workload-
related changes in Departmental policy and procedures.
The department also agreed to a number of emergency pro-
cedures to end the crisis at Non-Residence by increasing
staff, reducing paperwork and improving working conditions.
Although it agreed to take no reprisals against staff who
participated and to rescind the seventeen suspensions the
department refused to pay staff who participated in the
work stoppage for the time they didn't work. The SSEU
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membership approved a voluntary assessment of ten dollars
per member to help reimburse the Non-Residence staff for
the pay they had lost while winning gains for all of the
staff. 18 Judy Mage later remarked "We were emboldened,
but we won more at Non-Residence than we would (from
subsequent negotiations.) "19
Fact-finding on wages and negotiations on all other
issues continued after the Non-Residence work stoppage.
The sanitationmen sent Jack Bigel to help the SSEU nego-
tiators, and union activity continuee as it had during
1966. The fight against Tri-Partite went before City
Council again, and the union actively opposed the Taylor
Law in Albaby. The conflict with Local 371 continued and
the SSEU kept up its contract implementation pressure
through active prosecution of grievances. Another trans-
fer crisis occurred. The Community Action Committees
sponsored speaking engagements by Citywide and Tenants'
Rights Organization leaders and held demonstrations on rent
control and food stamp issues. Caseloads continued to
rise adding over 10,000 recipients to the roles every
month.20
During this period the department and the administra-
tion unilaterally took some policy-related actions orig-
inally called for in the SSEU Collective Bargaining Pro-
gram. The department began an affidavit experiment in
two welfare centers, opened discussions with the city's
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public housing authority on revising its eligibility
standards for recipients and began to consider acquiring
a number of hotels for the housing of certain recipients.
Lindsay sponsored a bill in the state legislature to
make housing discrimination against welfare recipients
illegal and the Board of Estimate and City Council in-
creased the budget authorization for day-care centers by
$5 million. In addition to the monthly hiring quota
established after the Non-Residence Center crisis, the
department hired several hundred temporary workers for
the summer.21
The large number of new workers hired by the de-
partment in the nine months preceeding June 1967 created
an unanticipated problem for the SSEU. Over 1,000 workers
were hired by the department after the SSEU's September
1966 and Non-Residence work actions. These caseworkers
were neither familiar with nor committed to the union. In
1966 the union had convinced the city to give ex-caseworkers
preferential treatment if they decided to return to the
department. This policy resulted in a number of transients,
people who worked for a couple of months, left for a
couple of months and then returned to work again. The
summer workers and transients had no committment to the
job or to the union and couldn't be counted on to support
a strike. New caseworkers who were committed to the
union created another kind of problem. Some of them were
radicals or college activists who had joined the union be-
cause of its militant reputation. They'd missed the by
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then fancus 1965 strike and wanted one of their own. 2 2
Generally, though, caseworker morale was low. Experienced
caseworkers who were also solid union members began to
complain that their contract was not solving their prob-
lems, that unionism as a mechanism for change was not
working. In fact the tiring contract implementation strug-
gle created more problems. Job actions had taken their toll
of membership trust and energy.23 This disillusionment and
the debate over client organizing sparked a damaging debate
over the use -of union funds and prompted four slates,
some conservative and some radical, to run against the Mage
slate in the union's Spring elections.24 All of this would
have an effect on membership support for the union's bar-
gaining position during the summer but in the second week
of April Judy Mage received a tremendous vote of confidence;
her slate won the hard-fought election campaign with between
fifty six and sixty three percent of the votes cast, the
largest margin in SSEU history. Her campaign promised to
successfully complete contract negotiations and move the
union "toward greater control of our jobs and a greater
impact on the-community." 2 5
On March 15 Benjamin Wolf released his fact-finding
report on wages. The union failed to win a substantially
different package than that negotiated by Local 371 for the
Hospital Care Investigators - a $1,350 raise. For a couple
of weeks the SSEU tried to convince Wolf to reconsider his
recommendations but failed. By this time union and city
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negotiations had concluded agreements on a,-number of minor
but no major issues. With wages settled by the fact-
finder Haber first delayed the selection of a date for
fact-finding then refused outright to submit any unresolved
netogiating issues to fact-finding as agreed at the end of
the three-day strike in January. Negotiations continued
but with little progress. In hopes of speeding up nego-
tiations with the administration the SSEU Executive Board
dropped thirty nine of its remaining seventy six demands.
Haber promptly characterized the union's remaining thirty
seven demands as not bargainable under Tri-Partite's manage-
ment prerogative or majority representation rules and again
refused to go to fact-finding. Over 1,000 SSEU members de-
monstrated in front of Haber's office publicly character-
izing his negotiating position as one of delay, evasion
and the abrogation of previous committments. Haber re-
fused to yield.26 Some leaders in both Local 371 and
the SSEU believed that Gotbaum and the administration,
assessing the SSEU's weakened political position and
internal difficulties, wanted to force a strike in order
.27
to break the city's most troublesome public employee union.
Events certainly didr't contradict that hypothesis.
The SSEU leadership felt trapped. They couldn't
allow the administration to go back on its public con-
mittnent to fact-finding nor could they allow themselves
to sign a contract which repudiated gains that they'd won
in 1965. They couldn't allow the administration to set
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caseworkers' salaries by refusing to grant them more than
Local 371 negotiated for the Hospital Care Investigators
and then allow the administration to label all other- issues
"not bargainable." To do so left them nothing, no raison
d'etre. They felt they had no alternative but to recom-
ment a strike, a strike against Tri-Partite and for sur-
vival, a strike to preserve their concept of professional
unionism.28
On May 24 the union leadership recommended that the
Executive Board label twelve of the union's remaining
thirty seven demands "primary demands," that they inform
the media of these twelve demands and prepare the staff
for a work action on June 19. The twelve demands included:
penalty pay for overwork when the contract was violated; a
theft, damage and. disability fund for workers assaulted
while on the job; preservation of the shorter summer work
day; their 1965 collective bargaining clause; a labor-
management committee with an impartial chairman; easements
on excessive pendings; an automatic clothing grant for
clients and the right for caseworkers to refuse some clerical
and messenger chores.29 Five of the twelve primary demands
came from the 1965 contract. Leaflets and press releases
went out and local membership meetings took place in all
work locations on or before May 31. On June 6 a general
membership meeting overwhelmingly endorsed the proposed
work action and on June 19 the full membership ratified
it in a secret ballot at all welfare centers. Local 371
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ordered its members not to do out-of-title work during the
proposed work action.0 On June 19 the SSEU began its second
major strike in thirty months. If it was successful the
SSEU leadership planned to reopen salary negotiations. 3 1
In order to avoid Condon-Wadlin Act penalties, the
SSEU did not actually strike. As in the Non-Residence
work stoppage, the SSEU went out by working-in. The union's
work-in rules required members to report for work as
usual but to avoid their normal routines. Members would
do no written work or dictation, no field work and no inter-
viewing of clients at intake or otherwise. They would not
answer their telephones or read case records. Instead
they would conduct seminars on housing problems, Spanish
and community resources available to clients and hold
discussions on local grievances, caseload problems, de-
partmental procedures and training programs. The union
prohibitted card-playing, chess, guitars and other forms
of amusement.32 The administration charged that case-
workers participating in the work stoppage hindered the
efforts of the working staff. On the first day the
department suspended 175 caseworkers for harrassment, on
the second, 150, and on the third, 250. On June 26 it
refused to allow caseworkers participating in- the work
stoppage into the welfare centers. The union called this
a lockout; the city called it a strike. 3 3
Why, given that they'd already won a substantial
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wage increase and given that they were deeply divided over
the union's policy initiatives, did the caseworkers strike?
They didn't. On the first day of the work action, the
union claimed ninety percent participation; the department
claimed only two thirds worked-in. Judy Mage admitted
that the union only had seventy five percent support that
first day and that after the first two weeks even that
support began to erode steadily.3 4 Union strength varied
from center to center - in one, only five out of 137 case-
workers stayed on the job - but during the first two weeks
long lines of recipients seeking services backed up at
most centers.35 As the strike wore on the department de-
veloped emergency procedures to handle recipient requests
and more and more caseworkers returned to work. Lindsay
publicly applauded those who returned to work. The union
attacked them in leaflets and its members harrassed them
on picket lines. Magy workers who stayed out during the
strike did so more for their loyalty to chapter offices
than support for the issues.36 Many of those who returned
to work did so because as they saw it, they'd already won
37
a substantial salary increase.
Citywide refused to support either the January or the
mid-summer SSEU strikes. Its big June 30 City Hall demon-
stration was not related to the SSEU strike. The SSEU held
its own City Hall demonstration three days before. Some
Citywide leaders had begun to argue that their partial
-123-
acceptance of the CAC argument that what's good for the
workers is good for the clients allowed the union to run
its own political agenda on them. They told the SSEU CAC
Chairman to stop attending Citywide Executive Board meet-
ings. However, CAC members went ahead and used their per-
sonal relationships with local WRO's to organize active
client support for union activities. So many recipients
joined the January 11 SSEU demonstration in front of the
offices of the state Department of Welfare that members
of the Citywide Executive Board had to join them or lose
some of their credibility as recipient leaders.38 During
the six week strike, CAC members passed out bi-lingual
leaflets in client communities urging ther not to stop
going to welfare centers for service during the strike.
At first they succeeded, but in July Citywide organized a
number of welfare center demonstrations to protest the in-
creasing recipient hardship caused by the strike. First
the demonstrators called for more efficient provision of
emergency services during the strike, then for an end to
the strike itself. Although these demonstrations did aid
the strike by compounding the Welfare Department's problems,
they did not result from a friendly alliance between Citywide
and the SSEU. The SSEU was unable to organize full com-
munity support for the strike. 39
The strike dragged on. Lindsay ridiculed the union
for accepting a $1,300 wage increase then striking to win
telephones for recipients and charged that by striking,
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the union displayed a "contemptible" and "irresponsible"
disregard for the needs of its clients. 4 0 The union res-
ponded that the city's refusal to negotiate during the
strike, as it had in January, contributed to the hardship
of clients and that the city's propaganda contributed to
41
the violence between striking and non-striking caseworkers.
The SSEU leadership charged that DC 37 and the city had con-
spired to break their union. One Saturday evening case-
workers heckled Gotbaum at a theater, forcing him to leave. 4 2
Not everyone lost his sense of humor. When the Teamsters,
SSEU supporters, learned that the. city of Jerusalem had
invited Commissioner Ginsberg to help it reorganize its
social service system, they offered the Israelis $500,000
to keep him.43 On July 17 a Committee of Clergymen Con-
cerned about the Welfare Crisis failed to bring the union
and the administration together. On the 22nd the city
arrested 160 union pickets and shortly thereafter secret
mediation sessions began between the two sides. On July
24 with fifty percent of the caseworkers back on the job
the SSEU leadership accepted the mediator's proposal to
end the strike and recommended his terms to their member-
ship. At a stormy meeting that evening the SSEU member-
ship overwhelmingly rejected their leaders' agreement
because it allowed reprisals against twenty nine union
leaders, i.e. two week suspensions and mandatory trans-
fers. Afraid that they might never get their remaining
-125-
striking members to vote to end the strike and afraid
that the city might refuse additional mediation, hire new
workers and leave them out on the streets for good, the
SSEU leadership went back to the mediator.4 4 DC 37,
Local 371, the Teamsters and Sanitationmen urged the
city to take no reprisals. After three days the mediator,
whom DeLury had brought into the dispute, 4 5 changed his
proposal to exclude all suspensions and offered to per-
sonally review the department's case for each of the
twenty nine transfers. On July 30 the SSFU membership
voted 692 to 430 to.accept this revised agreement. Haber
signed the next day. On August 1 the strike ended with
the union bitterly divided between those who returned to
work and those who stayed out until the end. Many were
angry that Local 371 had not honored their picket lines.
The SSEU lost everything. In the agreement to end
their strike they accepted mediation, not fact-finding,
and that only on issues the administration considered bar-
gainable. They also agreed to substitute the management
prerogative and anti-strike language of Tri-Partite in
place of their Labor-Management Committee which had in-
cluded arbitration machinery. The final contract agreed
to on August 15 and signed on September 21 included im-
proved transfer protections and grievance machinery and
some other gains. The administration agreed to bend
Tri-Partite's rules and include caseload limits if the
union would agree to waive them for thirty days and agree
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to submit city requests for extension of the waiver to
arbitration. But the contract contained no provisions
regarding policies or procedures affecting clients and
provided for twice as many Assistant as Senior Case-
workers. In addition the department established a
Case Aide title below that of Assistant Caseworker.46
It took a while for the union to recover from its
defeat. It was broke. The membership had no confidence
in the union's ability to protect them from reprisals,
neither did their leadership.47 On December 13, however,
several hundred caseworkers demonstrated against the
continuing extension of the waiver of the caseload limit
in their new contract. The arbitrator didn't finally
cancel the waiver until April, 1968.48
After the strike the SSEU tried to organize a new local
of other employees in the Human Resources Administration
of which the Welfare Department had recently been made a
part. The union thought that the administration would in-
clude all other HRA agencies in one bargaining unit. The
SSEU had strength in the Manpower and Career Development
Agency (MCDA) where an independent NFSSE affiliate existed
which had applied for city recognition. DC 37 had Local
1509 in the Youth Board. The two would have to fight it
out. The SSEU sent its organizers into the Youth Board
and the Community Development Agency. On October 30 the
city divided the HRA agencies into two bargaining units,
leaving some employees out of both. The city placed most
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MCDA staff in Local 1509's unit and excluded the rest from
either unit. The SSEU charged that DC 37 dominated both
new units and withdrew from the proposed election.4 9
The SSEU entered 1968 looking for merger or affili-
ation with another union.
EPILOGUE
Soon after the 1967 strike Judy Mage named an
Affiliations Committee composed of eighteen experienced
SSEU leaders to examine the possibility of an SSEU merger
or affiliation with another union. In March 1968 after
reviewing offers from District Council 37 and the Fur,
Leather and Machine Workers Joint Board (FLMW), the
Committee reported on its deliberations to the Executive
Board but made no recommendations. About half of the
Committee favored merger with their old rival Local 371
and affiliation with their old enemy DC 37. The other
half wanted to petition the supervisors once more for a
bargaining election. If they got sixty five percent of
the supervisors toceign-they wanted to proceed with a
jurisdictional election and if victorious remain inde-
pendent. If they failed to get a sixty five percent peti-
tion or lo;! the subisequent election this group favored
affiliation with the FLMW Joint Board. The Executive
Board Delegates were less divided than their leaders.
After several weeks of debate they voted to accept the
idea of joining DC 37 by merging with Local 371 in principle
and to reopen negotiations with both in order to receive
more favorable terms. Local 371 wanted control over the
proposed new local's executive committee in order to
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counteract caseworker dominance of the proposed merged
local. The new SSEU President Miartin Morgenstern, who
succeeded Judy Mage, reopened negotiations with DC 37 and
Local 371. Local 371's strength within the Council had
slipped when the Council removed the clerks from its
jurisdiction and placed them in a new citywide clerical
local. The new terms negotiated by Morgenstern included
a more democratic structure for the proposed new local,
an evenly divided executive committee, more policy
making power in the general membership and a sixty
percent greater dues kickback from the District Council
than originally offered so that the proposed new local
could remain somewhat independent of the Council by rent-
ing its own offices, retaining its own legal counsel and
hiring its own organizing staff. The Executive Board re-
commended merger to the membership. On June 28 after a
very hard fought campaign, sixty two percent of the member-
ship voted in favor of merger with Local 371 and affiliation
with DC 37. Affiliation required a two thirds majority
and since a number of members were on vacation the
Executive Board postponed reconsideration until after
the completion of contract negotiations that winter. In
the fall Local 371 and the SSEU agreed to joint negoti-
ations with the City and the SSEU scheduled'its second
vote on merger for January 10, 1969. This time it passed
with seventy nine percent of thei membership in favor.
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Local 371's membership agreed soon thereafter and that
summer the two unions became the Social Service Employees
Union Local 371, District Council 37 AFSCME, AFL-CIO.
The March 1968 Affiliations Committee report reveals
how much the events of 1966 and 1967 changed some of the
leaders' and many of the members' attitudes toward union-
ism and the kind of union they'd worked to build. A
number of themes run through the section of the document
urging affiliation with DC 37. First the writers rejected
the SSEU's professional or craft union stance which
prevented any alliance with the clerks. Dual unionism
had allowed the City to play one union off against the
other creating the 1967 disaster. Second, they wanted
the SSEU to grow, to organize kindred workers in the
HRA and anti-poverty ggencies. Without a strong secure
base in welfare, they argued, the SSEU could not expect to
attract other workers. Third, they feared that if the union
didn't affiliate soon the 1967 disaster would repeat itself
during 1969 contract negotiations. Only this time the union
might not have the chance to pick up the pieces afterwards. 2
They argued that the union couldn't expect to win a
representative- election among the supervisors. SSEU super-
visory membership had dropped to half of its March 1967
level and the union couldn't offer the supervisors a better
deal in 1969 than DC 37. If they lost, an election campaign
would leave both unions weak and divided for their 1969
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contract negotiations. If they won the election would
further isolate ther from the rest of the labor movement,
rule out future affiliation with DC 37 and drain union
funds just before the 1969 contract fight. Since Gotbaum
would try to win the supervisors back they might never
have a chance to consolidate their new strength.3
Affiliation with the FLMW Joint Board or any other
non-AFSCME union, they argued, would permanently dis-
unite staff, perpetuating craft unionism in the Depart-
ment, and result in continuing jurisdiction disputes with
DC 37. DC 37 had just won an agency shop clause in Local
371's contract, i.e. supervisors could neither negotiate
nor designate their dues check-off for the SSEU. Approx-
imately one half ofrthe SSEU Executive Board were either
supervisors or about to become supervisors. Failing to
affiliate with AFSCME would result in a continuing loss
of SSEU leadership to Local 371. Finally, they argued,
since DC 37 already had majority status under OCB rules
for negotiations on city wide issues an independent or
non-AFSCME affiliated SSEU could neither represent its
members' interests nor promise to represent the interests of
those it planned to organize on these important issues. 4
The 1968 Affiliations Committee report contained the
following additional arguments for affiliating with DC 37,
arguments which SSEU members finally accepted. Affiliation
would emotionally unify staff in time for 1969 contract
negotiations and allcw department staff to present the
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administration with a credible strike threat. The proposed
new local of 10,000 plus members would automatically become
one of DC 37's largest locals with twenty percent of the
vote in the Delegate Assembly, DC 37's governing body. The
SSEU would find itself in a much stronger position to
oppose OCB policies by altering DC 37's support from the
inside than it could ever expect to have as an independent
or as an affiliate of a non-public employee union. It
would also have an important say in DC 37's pension and
overtime negotiations. Finally, the report pointed out,
DC 37 was the only union in the City organizing unorganized
public employees. Since most of these new members were
Black they would push Gotbaum to the left, toward the
SSEU's political position.5 (During the Ocean Hill Browns-
ville school decentralization fight Gotbaum did not join
other labor leaders's opposition to decentralization.)6
Nowhere did the Affiliations Committee members who
supported affiliation with AFSCME mention reforming specific
welfare department procedures and policies or changing the
nature of the caseworker's job. Their arguments would have
been alien to the union which entered the Hospital Care In-
vestigator transfer fight in February 1966. But they can-
not be characterized as anti-client. One was a member of
the Mage Executive Committee for two years and at least
one other a close ally.7
The merged SSEU Local 371 would have more staff
per member and maintain the highest level of grievance
-133-
work and service to members among DC 37's locals. Composed
of young, tough members it would continue to fight high
caseloads, transfers and suspensions with center based
work actions. It would keep its own newspaper, community
action and political representatives and would engage in
more legal activity than any other AFSCME local.8 However,
it would no longer take departmental policy issues to the
bargaining table, into the political arena with lobbying,
picket lines and protest demonstrations yes, into col-
lective bargaining no.
While the SSEU debated affiliation and revised its
conception of itself as a union, the Department of Welfare
under a new Commissioner planned its own reorganization,
which emphasized separation of services. Eligibility
determination, budget computation and most other paper-
work duties handled by caseworkers would become clerical
duties handled by a new income maintenance section. Case-
workers would continue to provide services but would only
handle cases designated as service cases, i.e. some
recipients would never come in contact with caseworkers.
The department intended to fully implement reorganization
within two years. During that period the Department planned
to hire over 1,000 new case aides and over 2,000 additional
clerical workers. It planned to reduce the number of case-
workers from over 8,000 to under 2,500.9
When Local 371, Local 1509 (the AFSCME clerical
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local) and thie SSEU entered joint negotiations in the fall
of 1968 with Victor Gotbaum as chief negotiator, the
leadership involved wanted to demonstrate the advantages
of merger and affiliation to the membership of Local 371
and the SSEU. "The key point of joint bargaining is
merger," said 1artin Morgenstern. 1They wanted to avoid
a strike and win significant contract gains. But the
department had yet to release its reorganization plans and
rumors about mass layoffs and downgrading permeated the
department. They thought that the department's refusal
to discuss reorganization with the union right mean that
it wanted another strike and that the caseworkers, con-
cerned for their jobs, might oblige. They decided that
they had to force the administration to discuss its reor-
ganization plans, if it refused they would have to prepare
for a strike. 1 1
By threatening a strike they forced a description of
reorganization out of the department and a promise that
caseworker reduction would take place through attrition
rather than layoffs. SSEU President Morgenstern expressed
some concern that the department had underestimated both
the number of cases requiring service and the number of
caseworkers necessary to handle them and argued that this
would result in high workloads and poor quality service.
Gotbaum prevailed upon the unions not to try to negotiate
the specifics of reorganization but to stick to job secur-
ity and cash:
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Reorganization is not (the Commissioner's) idea.
It is the trend of the times. We cannot fight
the change. We have to make sure of money....
There is going to be a cutback. We should go for
stability and money.12
The negotiators concerned themselves with the alter-
ations in job descriptions, out-of-title work, downgrading
and loss of promotional opportunities expected under
reorganization.13 The unions demanded guarantees against
lay-offs, downgrading and transfers, special training pro-
visions, maintenance of promotional opportunities,
various job security guarantees and, at the insistence of
the SSEU, workload and manning limits. In the end they
settled for cash. Caseworkers received an $1,100 increase
in salary plus a $400 per year "reorganization adjustment
intended as compensation for the personal impact attendant
upon such reorganization. ,14 The final contract contained
no caseload limit, for the first time in SSEU history, and
eliminated the Senior Caseworker title, downgrading exist-
ing Seniors to Caseworker without a loss in pay. Reorgani-
zation proceeded somewhat haphazardly and caseloads rose
rapidly, precipitating a crisis that fall. Center based
work actions and a threatened strike resulted in a new
agreement between the union and the department. In January
of 1970 the department agreed to maintain a city wide ave-
rage caseload limit of seventy five, hire or transfer
workers in order to guarantee that average and pay each
caseworker a supplementary workload salary adjustment of
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$720 per year. The elimination of individual caseload
limits, acceptance of reorganization and the resulting
caseload crisis angered caseworkers and cost Morgenstern
the presidency of SSEU Local 371 in the spring of 1970.15
He had, however, achieved his primary goal - an SSEU
merger with Local 371 and affiliation with DC 37.
One other interesting change took place during 1969
contract negotiations. The joint negotiating committee
had its hands full determining the effects of reorgani-
zation on each of the titles it represented, fifty alone
between Local 371 and the SSEU, and then figuring out some
way to protect the workers in each of these titles from
the inevitable chaos of reorganization. The negotiating
committee had to coordinate career ladders, transfer poli-
cies, center administration, salary ratios, workload flow,
and other procedures among these titles. For instance,
the Department had yet to receive civil service clearance
for Case Aides or Hospital Care Investigators, who did not
have college degrees, to advance into Caseworkers titles.
Reorganization's planned reduction in caseworkers cut
off that job as a form of advancement, a career ladder these
people had expected. The union wanted a lack of promotional
opportunity increment for these titles.16 Similar problems
kept the joint negotiating committee too busy to go into
departmental policies. Caseworkers had dominated the SSEU
when it represented only eight titles in 1967. Reorganiza-
tion would reduce caseworker membership within the union
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to under 4,500. One third of these people would be working
17
in income maintenance not on service cases. At the same
time affiliation with AFSCME would allow the merged local
to organize among IIRA and anti-poverty agency staffs,
bringing more titles into the union. Caseworkers thus
lost their central position in the department and in their
union at the same time. In 1971 SSEU Local 371, whose
membership continued to grow despite caseworker attrition,
bargained for eighty five different titles, all with
differing problems and priorities, 211 vying for leader-
ship attention and time. Somewhere in the middle of it
all, despite the fact that the union would continue to
draw its leadership from ex-SSEU activists, the caseworkers
got lost. "Our union became a dumping ground for titles
that the City didn't know what to do with.",l7 a -SSEU,-Local
371 would become a union with no specific interest except
the elimination of poverty and no longer focused on one
department. Its consultant, aide and supervisory titles
would cover several departments and agencies.
The union would continue its interest in welfare
policy but would confine its activity to the courts,
informal discussions and consultation with the department
and the political arena. It would organize labor demon-
strations against welfare cutbacks, help raise money for
Citywide and join court tests of new Welfare Department
procedures or policies. But service to clients would no
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longer appear during collective bargaining. During reorgani-
zation the union's Service Committee, reacting to depletion
in staff and caseworker complaints that their only job
under reorganization was "to refer cases to someone else,"
recommended that the union sponsor work actions to force
the department to set service priorities, allow advocacy
work and schedule twenty percent of workers' time for
training.1 8 They never took place. Union workload actions
would continue but without the underlying purpose of im-
proving services. A 1972 Unionist article on the Service
Committee began "Unknown to most union members, a group of
fifteen or twenty unionsts are currently..." 19
The Lindsay administration and Victor Gotbaum won
their struggle against the SSEU.
Before reorganization caseworkers had a unique
position among non-uniformed public employees. Their
title required a college degree and their job permitted
flexibility. Most city titles did neither. Clerks,
building inspectors and toll collectors worked in jobs that
it was inconceivable that the City could ever change. The
city titles that had similar requirements and discretion
included less people than the caseworker titles. They
couldn't mount a credible strike threat on their own. When
the SSEU and Local 371 merged the New York City Welfare
Department employed over 9,500 caseworkers.20 A smaller
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membership base would be unlikely to contain either the
leadership or the financial resources to build a strong
union. There is one group of non-uniformed public em-
ployees with flexible jobs, college degrees and the advan-
tage of numbers-- the teachers. During the 1960's they
too, became deeply involved in policy matters. They had
one advantage over the caseworkers. Politically they were
less vulnerable. They had higher prestige and more widely
recognized professional credentials. When they struck they
inconvienced everybody, not just the poor, and the administra-
tion could not downgrade or eliminate their jobs.
Lindsay may well have preferred to run the school
system without teachers. During his administration the
teachers carried out two major strikes and defeated his
school decentralization plan - that transfer crisis at
Ocean Hill - Brownsville.21 Lindsay used the full
weight of the Taylor Law against the teachers. He fined
their union (United Federation of Teachers, UFT), jailed
their leaders and revoked their dues check-off privileges.
All to no avail, the UFT continued to thwart his admini-
stration's policies. In 1969 while the caseworkers were
losing out the UFT got a preamble attached to its contract
which discussed the "joint responsibilities and goals" 2 2
of the Board of Education and the UFT. The preamble went
on to require monthly meetings between the union and the
Superintendant to discuss matters of educational policV and
development, establish a joint committee on discipline,
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planning and cirriculum and insure the continuance of
certain educational experiments supported by the union. 2 3
The UFT avoided the demand for control over policy making
made by the SSEU. The teachers preferred to fight against
administrative changes they opposed and for the extension
of programs they approved rather than for a contractually
defined partnership in policy making. The UFT kept its
demands within typical trade union issues, salary, safety,
advancement, job security and workload. It was this
last one which ostensibly caused Lindsay so much trouble
with the unions. At the street level policy and workload
issues are virtually indistinguishable. When the Lindsay
administration tried to improve the delivery of city
services to the Blacks and the Puerto Ricans in its
electoral coalition, the white public employee unions
fought the changes. The policemen didn't want to work
during high crime hours24 nor did they want limits on the
level of force they could use when they did work.2 5
The Sanitationmen didn't want to pick up more garbage
in the ghetto and the teachers didn't want to have to teach
"disruptive" students.26 The unions argued that these were
all matters of safety and workload. Others felt otherwise.
The UFT 1972 contract demands produced the following out-
burst from the United Parents Association (UPA),
The rights of parents and the managerial rights of
those responsible for administering the schools
cannot be bargained away under the guise of "improved
working conditions" and "job security." Too often
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in the past items of educational policy have been
traded off because they have little or no fin-
ancial cost. This must stop: 2 7
The SSEU's attempts to influence policy strayed from
these trade union issues and divided the membership. It
was one thing in 1965 to assume a commality of interests
between caseworkers and clients. It was another
thing entirely in 1967 to put down on paper for all to see
specific policies and procedures designed to realize
those common interests. Inevitably some members found
such proposals inadequate or inappropriate and others
considered them threatening. But many had joined the
SSEU in spite of its policy initiatives because it
effectively won traditional trade union benefits for its
members, higher salaries, increased safety measures,
career ladders, job security and lower workloads. The
SSEU's obvious willingness in 1967 to commit union re-
sources to its fight for policy proposals without at the
same time clearly linking those proposals to workload,
protection and salary demands upset these members,
intensified the debate within the union and contributed
to its defeat that summer.28
But the teachers haven't lost yet. They may yet
become the first public employee union to openly help set
policy. The enforceability of their 1969 preamble is still
in the courts although it is not in their present contract.2 9
And DC 37 when it finally settles the salary and career
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needs of its members, many of whom are in low prestige
and low paying jobs, may turn more to departmental and
agency policy matters. When it does it has all of the
employees in the welfare department to work with.
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